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"The homestead may be a splendid mansion, a cabin or a tent,"'
but can it be a cooperative apartment? The supreme courts of both
Florida and Georgia recently have answered this question in the nega-
tive. The Florida Supreme Court denied to a widow a homestead ex-
emption in her deceased husband's cooperative apartment, ruling that a
cooperator has no proprietary interest in the apartment, the building,
or the land on which the building is situated.2 The Georgia Supreme
Court denied a homestead tax exemption to cooperators because they
lacked the characteristics of ownership needed to bring them within the
constitutional exemption from taxation for "owners" of a homestead.3
Both decisions ignore the claimants' use of their apartments as their
primary residences.
The refusal to bring stock-owned cooperative apartments within
the purview of homestead statutes deprives cooperators of valuable
protections granted to owners of other dwelling units.4 Such refusals
result from the use of technical and mechanical distinctions, rather
than a broader, more purpose-oriented approach in definition, thereby
ignoring the policy consideration at the very heart of homestead ex-
emption statutes-protection of a debtor's home. Such refusals also re-
flect the law's continued inability to deal with the hybrid nature of the
cooperator's interest in a stock-owned cooperative apartment. This
treatment has resulted in an unnecessary gap in homestead coverage
t The invaluable research work of Theresa Holmes, third year law student, University of
Kentucky and Timothy Shane O'Neill, JD. 1978, University of Kentucky, and the editorial work of
Carolyn Dye, JD. 1976, Univerlity of Kentucky in the preparation of this article deserve special
recognition.
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky B.A. 1965, State University of New
York at Albany, J.D. 1974, Syracuse University
1. Kleinert v. Lefkowitz, 271 Mich. 79, 92, 259 N.W. 871, 875 (1935).
2. In re Estate of Wartels, 357 So. 2d 708 (Fla. 1978) (probate homestead exemption).
3. Brandywine Townhouses, Inc. v. Joint City-County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 231 Ga. 585,
203 S.E.2d 222 (1974) (homestead tax exemption).
4. Available demographic data indicate that the elderly disproportionately feel the impact
of such refusals. I U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEVELOPMENT, CONDOMINIUM COOPERA-
TIVE STUDY 111-58.
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that can dissappoint the expectations of a layperson who thinks he or
she "owns" a cooperative apartment.
This article explores the nature and history of homestead exemp-
tion statutes and the interests that have been recognized as sufficient to
support a homestead exemption. The article next surveys the legal
treatment of cooperative apartment interests. Methods that those states
with the highest number of cooperatives have chosen or might choose
to resolve the issue of the permissibility of a cooperative homestead are
also examined. Finally, the article discusses several problems attending
the extension of homestead coverage to cooperatives.
II. HOMESTEAD LEGISLATION
In 1839 the Republic of Texas adopted the first homestead law in
America.5 That statute exempted certain property of a debtor from
levy for satisfaction of debts due to creditors. This concept proved pop-
ular, and by the beginning of the Civil War, all but a few states had
adopted some form of homestead exemption.6
The underlying policy of the exemptions was not to secure to the
person claiming it a certain dollar amount of property free from credi-
tors' claims. Instead, the exemptions were primarily designed to pro-
tect homes and families.7 The homestead laws, unlike bankruptcy
laws, did not discharge liability for debts. The creditor could continue
to prosecute his or her claim as though the debtor were not within the
protection of the homestead law, and a judgment could be entered
against the debtor. The homestead mechanism provided protection by
making the homestead unavailable for satisfaction of the debt.8 Al-
though the homestead exemption occasionally saved the home of a
poor debtor from creditors, homestead legislation was not intended to
benefit only the poor. The homestead statute adopted in most states
secured the family home for all economic classes; any person, rich or
poor, could claim its protection.9
The early supporters of homestead statutes believed that the state,
as well as individuals, benefited.'° The statutes indirectly protected the
public, which otherwise would have been burdened with the support of
the insolvent debtor's family." Homestead advocates also believed
that the exemption policies helped to ensure a republican form of gov-
ernment, not only by protecting the state's residents from destitution,
5. W. NUNN, A STUDY OF THE TEXAS HOMESTEAD AND OTHER EXEMPTIONS 2 (1931).
6. L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 214-15 (1973).
7. R. WAPLES, HOMESTEAD AND EXEMPTION 3 (1892).
8. Id. at 8.
9. Id. at 3.
10. J. SMYTH, THE LAW OF HOMESTEAD AND EXEMPTIONS 49 (1875). This idea of the state
as an incidental beneficiary of homestead laws is still accepted. See Ferguson v. Roberts, 64 Ariz.
357, 361, 170 P.2d 855, 857 (1946).
11. W. NUNN, supra note 5, at 2; 27 OHIO JUR. 2D Homesteads § 3 (1957).
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but also by encouraging ". . . those feelings of sublime independence
which are so essential to the maintenance of free institutions."' 2
Other factors promoted the enactment of homestead legislation.
The boom and bust economic conditions in the mid-nineteenth century
contributed to the passage of such legislation.' 3 Michigan, for example,
adopted its legislation in direct response to the financial conditions
caused by the Panic of 1837.14 To encourage immigration, other states
specifically adopted homestead laws that offered the immigrant protec-
tion from creditor's claims.' 5 More recently, the Supreme Court of
Minnesota suggested that homestead exemption laws actually en-
courage the fulfillment of the debtor's obligations. The court reasoned
that debtors whose connection with the community is stabilized by a
protected interest in a relatively permanent home are more likely to
satisfy the claims of their creditors than are debtors who are not so tied
to the community.
16
Today homestead laws exist in every state except Delaware, Mary-
land, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, the District of Columbia,' 7 and New
Jersey.' 8 Nevertheless, homestead provisions are often ineffective. In
some instances, eligible debtors do not invoke the protection of home-
stead provisions because they are unaware that such statutes exist.' 9
Furthermore, in many states, homestead statutes exempt property only
in a stated dollar amount, an amount which has not been increased in
response to current economic conditions. 20 Because of nonuse and in-
adequate exemption, homestead statutes do not achieve their pur-
pose-to protect the family home.
Because the homestead exemption is statutorily created, its provi-
sions vary from state to state. "Homestead" can be defined as a family
residence owned, occupied, dedicated, limited, exempted, and re-
12. Franklin v. Coffee, 18 Tex. 413, 416 (1857). In 1829 United States Senator Thomas
Benton, in advocating the adoption of a general homestead policy, said:
Tenantry is unfavorable to freedom. It lays the foundation for separate orders in society,
annihilates the love of country and weakens the spirit of independence. The tenant has in
fact, no country, no hearth, no domestic alter, no household god. The freeholder, on the
contrary is the natural supporter of a free government; and it should be the policy of republics
to multiply their freeholders, as it is the policy of monarchies to multiply tenants.
I T. BENTON, THIRTY YEARS VIEW 103-04 (1854-56).
13. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, at 213.
14. See Kleinert v. Lefkowitz, 271 Mich. 79, 83, 259 N.W. 871, 872 (1935).
15. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, at 215.
16. Denzer v. Prendergast, 267 Minn. 212, 216, 126 N.W.2d 440, 443 (1964).
17. Haskins, Homestead Exemptions, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1289, 1290 & n.10 (1950). Delaware,
Rhode Island and the District of Columbia exempt only chattels from execution. Maryland and
Pennsylvania provide an exemption which may be claimed in either realty or personalty but be-
cause the provisions exempt $100 and $300 of value, respectively, they cannot be intended to
protect the home of the debtor.
18. See text accompanying notes 220-36 infra.
19. Haskins, supra note 17, at 1300.
20. For example, in Kentucky the original homestead act of February 10, 1866, exempted
homesteads of $1,000 in value from sale for debts. DiG. GEN. LAWS Ky. 714 (Clarke Supp. 1866).
The amount has remained unchanged. Ky. REV. STAT. § 427.060 (1972).
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strained in alienability as prescribed by statute. 2' Beyond this broad
definition, however, the homestead exemption eludes meaningful gen-
eralizations. For example, while in its ordinary sense a homestead is a
family residence, some jurisdictions do not require the claimant to have
a family. 22 On the other hand, the exemption is always subject to limi-
tations of monetary value, size, or both. Some jurisdictions distinguish
between the amount of property exempted for urban and rural home-
steads. 23 Nearly half the states require actual occupancy of the prop-
erty by the claimant.2 4 The majority of states do not require a formal
declaration of homestead; occupancy by the claimant or notification of
a homestead claim to specified persons at the time of levy or sale of the
property is sufficient to establish the exemption.25 Some states protect
spouses against alienation of the homestead by requiring the consent of
a title holder's spouse before conveyance or encumbrance of the prop-
erty. 26 Many of the states protect the family by continuing the exemp-
tion after the owner's death for the benefit of his or her family.
27
To establish a homestead, the claimant must establish a property
interest. This article later explores in more detail the type of property
interest that the claimant must demonstrate to support his or her home-
stead claim. At this point it is sufficient to note that a majority of the
statutory schemes do not prescribe the type of interest required to qual-
ify. 28 Instead, the courts have had to determine the sufficiency of prop-
erty interests that debtors have sought to have protected. In reaching
these determinations, the courts have considered both identifiable legis-
lative policies underlying homestead provisions and their own philoso-
phies concerning strict or liberal construction of those statutes.
In cases where the debtor is asking the court to protect a novel
kind of property interest, the court's attitude toward construction may
be the decisive factor. In construing and applying homestead laws, the
courts have generally recognized the importance of fulfilling the legis-
lative purpose 29 behind those laws-to protect the debtor's home and
family.3" This purpose remains constant whether the statute merely
provides a homestead during the debtor's life or also continues the ex-
21. R. WAPLES, supra note 7, at 1.
22. Haskins, supra note 17, at 1293.
23. R. WAPLES, supra note 7, at 8.
24. Haskins, supra note 17, at 1296-97. Even in those states requiring actual occupancy to
establish a homestead, homestead rights may be acquired in advance of actual occupancy if the
owner manifests an intent to occupy the property as a home by overt acts and does so within a
reasonable period of time.
25. Id. at 1297.
26. Id. at 1289-90.
27. Id. at 1290.
28. Id. at 1295.
29. J. SMYTH, supra note 10, at 89.
30. R. WAPLES, supra note 7.
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emption for the debtor's family after his or her death.3' Some courts,
which consider homestead statutes to be in derogation of the common
law, have construed the statutes strictly.32 These courts, however, have
based their decision on a misunderstanding of the common law. At
common law a person's home and contiguous land were inalienable
and indefeasible, except when required by the king or for defense of the
country.33 They were not subject to payment of a creditor's claim.
Even after the proscription against alienation of land had been sub-
stantially removed, creditors could not sell the debtor's land for satis-
faction of a debt.34 Only by statute did a creditor ever achieve the right
to take possession of the land of a debtor. 35 Furthermore, not until
1838 did a statute provide for sale of a debtor's land in satisfaction of a
debt.36 Thus, homestead exemption laws are not in derogation of the
common law. Rather, the statutes are the remnants of the common law
proscription against taking a debtor's land in satisfaction of debts.
The advisability of homestead laws has never been questioned se-
riously. The courts therefore should not unduly restrict or impede the
enjoyment of homestead benefits by narrow decisions and technicali-
ties.37 Instead, the courts should render sensible interpretations in light
of the purpose underlying the particular statute at issue. 38 A Massa-
chusetts court adopted such an approach in the early case of Gibson v.
Jenney,39 which dealt with an exemption for one cow and one hog.
The debtor asserted that the exemption continued even after the hog
had been slaughtered and packed away for use. The Massachusetts
court agreed, reasoning that because the statute was intended to pro-
vide sustenance for a poor family it was sensible to construe the statute
in a manner which would support the exemption.
The courts should construe homestead statutes to accomplish their
intended purpose-to protect the debtor's home. Although legislatures
adopted such statutes long before the advent of cooperative apartment
ownership, their purpose extends to cooperative apartments, as well as
to single-family residences. When a cooperative apartment serves as a
debtor's home, that apartment should qualify for the homestead ex-
emption.4°
31. Markle, The Condominium as Homestead Property, 14 HASTINGS L. REV. 320, 325 (1962-
63).
32. J. SMYTH, supra note 10, at 89.
33. Riggs v. Sterling, 60 Mich. 643, 647, 27 N.W. 705, 707 (1886).
34. Id.
35. For an account of the development of creditor's rights to debtor's property, see T.
PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 390, 392-93 (5th ed. 1956).
36. 1 & 2 Vict., C. 110, § 42 (1838).
37. Comment, Creation ofthe Homestead and Its Requirements, 26 CALIF. L. REV. 241, 250
(1937-38).
38. Gibson v. Jenney, 15 Mass. 205, 206 (1818).
39. 15 Mass. 205 (1818).
40. Mixon, Apartment Ownership in Texas.- Cooperative and Condominium, I Hous. L. REV.
226, 267 (1963-64).
No. 41
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III. PROPERTY INTERESTS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A HOMESTEAD
EXEMPTION
Homestead statutes usually do not define the property interest that
a homestead claimant must possess, and the various courts that have
construed such statutes have not agreed on the type of property interest
needed to support a homestead claim.4 In general, however, the courts
have held that the claimant need not have a present possessory interest
in fee simple absolute to claim the exemption.42 The courts have
uniformily recognized as sufficient any present possessory freehold es-
tate, including a life estate.43
Conversely, the cases are relatively uniform in holding that a fu-
ture interest, whether a vested or contingent remainder, a possiblity of
reverter, right of re-entry or an executory interest, is an insufficient in-
terest upon which to base a claim of homestead." The rationale for
this rule is that while the preceding estate continues, the owner of a
remainder interest does not have a present right or claim to occupy the
property. The present right to occupy the property is essential for a
claim of homestead.45 The "right to occupancy" rule has been applied
to deny a remainderperson a homestead exemption even when the
remainderperson occupies the premises during the life of the life tenant
41. See cases cited in Annot., 89 A.L.R. 511 (1934) and Annot., 74 A.L.R.2d 1355 (1960).
For purposes of this discussion, it is assumed that the other statutorily prescribed conditions
for establishing a homestead claim have been demonstrated and are not in issue. Although these
conditions precedent vary from state to state, they may include a requirement that the claimant
have a family, that the claimant occupy the subject property, that the property is the residence of
the claimant, or that the claimant file a formal declaration of homestead. Haskins, supra note 17,
at 1293. The only issue considered here is the court's resolution of whether the claimant's interest
in the property constitutes a property interest within the protection of the statute.
42. Doing v. Riley, 176 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1949). Accord, California Bank v. Schlesinger,
159 Cal. App. 2d 854, 324 P.2d 119 (1958); Bessemer Properties, Inc. v. Gamble, 158 Fla. 38, 27
So. 2d 832 (1946); Rice v. United Mercantile Agencies, 395 111. 512, 70 N.E.2d 618 (1946).
43. Deere v. Chapman, 25 Ill. 498 (1861). Accord, Brooks v. Goodwin, 123 Ark. 607, 186
S.W. 67 (1916); Economy Say. & Loan Co. v. Spencer, 75 Ohio L. Abs. 330, 144 N.E.2d 267 (Ct.
App. 1956).
44. Anemaet v. Martin-Senour Co., 114 So. 2d 23 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959); Stombaugh v.
Morey, 388 Il. 392, 58 N.E.2d 545 (1944); Cross v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 354 Mich. 455, 93
N.W.2d 233 (1958); Greenawalt v. Cunningham, 107 S.W.2d 1099 (Tex. Ct. App. 1937); Qualley
v. Zimmerman, 231 Wis. 341, 285 N.W. 735 (1939).
45. Keesee v. Bushart, 203 Ark. 668, 158 S.W.2d 915 (1942) (contingent remainders); Cross
v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 354 Mich. 455, 93 N.W.2d 233 (1958) (vested remainders); Gulf Produc-
tion Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 61 S.W.2d 185 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) (possibility of reverter). But
see Grattan v. Trego, 225 F. 705 (8th Cir. 1915) (holding that either the debtor's ownership of a
vested remainder in fee or his present possessory estate from year to year was sufficient to support
a homestead claim); Lehman v. Tucker, 176 Okla. 286, 55 P.2d 62 (1936) (indicating in dicta a
departure from the general rule). Contra, Denzer v. Prendergast, 267 Minn. 212, 126 N.W.2d 440
(1964) (judgment debtor who owned a vested remainder in fee subject to mother's life estate enti-
tled to homestead where he was in possession under an oral agreement that in exchange for sup-
port and maintenance of life tenant he and his family shared occupancy of the home with life
tenant); Gibbs v. Hunter, 99 S.C. 410, 83 S.E. 606 (1914) (claim of homestead in vested remainder
permitted); Panagopulos v. Manning, 93 Utah 198, 69 P.2d 614 (1937) (homestead claim permit-
ted to a claimant who owned a vested remainder in fee where claimant was in exclusive occupancy
under a verbal lease from year to year from life tenant and using it as his home).
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46with the latter's permission. Where the remainderperson occupies the
premises under some type of arrangement simultaneously with the life
tenant, or without life tenants, the courts have allowed that occupancy
to support a homestead claim. However, it will not prevent the sale of
the remainder interest.47
The owner of an estate for years can claim homestead protection
whether the term of the lease is one year or ninety-nine years.48 Be-
cause the homestead protection extended to the owner of a leasehold is
inferior to the lessor's title,49 however, the tenant's right to a homestead
exemption does not extend beyond the term of the lease.5 0 Courts have
also applied homestead laws to an estate from period to period.5'
Courts agree less as to whether estates at will or at sufferance are prop-
erty interests sufficient to support a claim of homestead. 2 Those cases
protecting these ephemeral interests have done so on the theory that if
the interest is subject to sale under execution, then ownership of that
interest coupled with the requisite occupancy rises to sufficient dignity
to be protected by the homestead exemption laws.53
Several cases have reserved for a surviving spouse or minor chil-
dren a homestead in the deceased spouse's unexpired leasehold. 4 It
has been argued that a decedent's unexpired leasehold interest consti-
tutes personalty in the hands of an administrator, and would thus be
subject to creditors' claims. In reliance on the overriding policy of
homestead statutes to protect the home and family of the debtor, how-
ever, courts have rejected this argument and have given the lessee's
46. Butler v. Parker, 200 Tenn. 603, 293 S.W.2d 174 (1956).
47. For example, A to B for life, then to C for life, remainder to D and his heirs. C is living
on the property with or without the life tenant B under a lease from B. Cs creditors could force
the sale of Cs life estate remainder, but Cs interest attributable to the lease would be protected.
Id Contra, Panagopulos v. Manning, 93 Utah 198, 69 P.2d 614 (1937); Denzer v. Prendergast, 267
Minn. 212, 126 N.w.2d 440 (1964).
48. See Annot., 89 A.L.R. 511, 555 (1934) and Annot., 74 A.L.R.2d 1355, 1378 (1960) and
cases cited therein.
49. Stombaugh v. Morey, 388 Ill. 392, 58 N.E.2d 545 (1944).
50. Miller v. Farmers State Bank, 137 Okla. 183, 279 P. 351 (1929). In Berry v. Dobson, 68
Miss. 483, 10 So. 45 (1891), the court refused to set off a homestead to the surviving spouse of a
tenant at will, but this decision is distinguishable because the deceased spouse's tenancy at will
terminated upon death. Therefore the deceased spouse's estate was not an owner of any interest in
the land sought to be claimed as a homestead.
51. In re Foley, 97 F. Supp. 843 (D. Neb. 1951) (oral month-to-month lease sufficient to
support homestead claim).
52. See Annot., 89 A.L.R. 511, 558 (1934) and Annot., 74 A.L.R.2d 1355, 1379 (1960) and
cases cited therein.
53. McGuire v. Van Pelt, 55 Ala. 344 (1876) (dicta); Mercer v. McKeel, 188 Okla. 280, 108
P.2d 138 (1940) (tenant by sufferance); Cleveland v. Milner, 141 Tex. 120, 170 S.W.2d 472 (1943)
(tenant at will).
At this point, one should note that an owner of a cooperative apartment has an estate for
years generally under a long term lease that he or she holds by virtue of a requisite stock owner-
ship.
54. Stombaugh v. Morey, 388 Ill. 392, 58 N.E.2d 545 (1944); Moncur v. Jones, 72 S.D. 202,
31 N.W.2d 759 (1948); Federal Land Bank v. King, 132 Tex. 481, 122 S.W.2d 1061 (1939).
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survivors a homestead claim in the unexpired leasehold.55 These deci-
sions indicate judicial refusal to allow homestead exemption to turn on
the niceties of technical classification of property interests;5 6 instead,
these courts look primarily to the policy behind the exemption laws to
support their decision.
Generally, any equitable interest will support a homestead exemp-
tion, as long as the interest gives the claimant a right to present posses-
sion. A debtor in possession who has had title placed in another as
security for a loan has been found to have a sufficient interest to sup-
port a homestead claim.5 7 A vendee-debtor's interest under a purchase
contract that gives the vendee a present right of possession will also
support a homestead claim. The vendee-debtor's exemption, however,
would be subject to claims of the vendor-creditor, one claiming
through the vendor-creditor,58 or one having a superior right in the
land.59 Even a donee who received a tract of land as consideration for
relinquishment of his expectant right of inheritance, took possession,
and made improvements has been permitted to claim a homestead
right in the property.6° A debtor in possession who has purchased
property but placed title in his or her spouse has been successful in
asserting a homestead claim,6 1 as has a debtor in possession paying the
purchase price but taking title in the name of a third person.62 A mort-
gagor's equity of redemption has been recognized as a sufficient interest
to support the establishment of a homestead claim by the mortgagor-
debtor or one claiming through the mortgagor-debtor. 63  A benefici-
ary's equitable interest in a trust is also sufficient to support a home-
stead exemption.64 However, a trustee who holds mere legal title
without any beneficial interest, whether the trust is express or implied,
does not have an interest in land sufficient to support a homestead
55. Miller v. Farmers State Bank, 137 Okla. 183, 279 P. 351 (1929).
56. Panagopulos v. Manning, 93 Utah 198, 69 P.2d 614 (1937).
57. Perry v. Adams, 179 Iowa 1215, 162 N.W. 817 (1917); Radford v. Kachman, 27 Ohio
App. 86, 160 N.E. 875 (1927).
58. Alexander v. Jackson, 92 Cal. 514, 28 P. 593 (1891); Inre Estate of Reid, 26 Cal. App. 2d
362, 79 P.2d 451 (1938). Contra, Thurston v. Maddocks, 88 Mass. (6 Allen) 427 (1863).
59. Snyder v. Pine Grove Lumber Co., 40 Cal. App. 2d 660, 105 P.2d 369 (1940) (homestead
claim of vendee disallowed as against purchaser on foreclosure of mortgage given by owner pur-
suant to an agreement between vendee and owner).
60. Atkins v. Schmid, 129 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. Ct. App. 1939). But see Doak v. Casner, 101
S.W.2d 1033 (Tex. Ct. App. 1937); Page v. Vaughn, 173 S.W. 541 (Tex. Ct. App. 1915) wherein a
vendee in possession under an oral contract without a deed but having paid the price could not
claim a homestead. No improvements had been made, so nothing took the oral agreement outside
the Statute of Frauds.
61. Bessemer Properties, Inc. v. Gamble, 158 Fla. 38, 27 So.2d 832 (1946); Kleinert v. Lefko-
witz, 271 Mich. 79, 259 N.W. 871 (1935).
62. Storey v. Storey, 275 Mich. 675, 267 N.W. 763 (1936) (title placed in name of sister of
purchaser); Meyer v. Platt, 137 Neb. 714, 291 N.W. 86 (1940) (title placed in name of daughter of
purchaser).
63. Roy v. Roy, 233 Ala. 440, 172 So. 253 (1937).




Absent a statute expressly to the contrary, the general rule pro-
vides that naked possession, without any title whatever, is sufficient to
support a homestead claim as against all the world except the true own-
er or one having better title.66 The theory underlying this position is
that if the debtor's mere possession is of sufficient value to be coveted
by creditors, it is of sufficient value to the debtor to enjoy homestead
protection. It is of no concern to a creditor that another person has
superior title.67 Not all of the cases support this position, however.
Several recent decisions have denied a homestead exemption on these
facts on the ground that the right of present possession is the essential
element of a homestead claim, not merely possession itself.68
This cursory review shows a myriad of cases which attempt to de-
fine the requisite property interest sufficient to support a homestead
claim. Reviewing the disparate treatment afforded similar interests in
various jurisdictions leaves the practitioner-reader frustrated. By not
defining the requisite property interest which they seek to protect, the
states' statutes and constitutional provisions are silent on the very point
where they should have spoken. Courts' uses of technical distinctions
between personalty and realty, future interests and present estates, and
rights of possession and mere possession to reach these decisions do
nothing to dispel the lack of satisfaction one has at the results in such
cases. It seems to this author that this mechanistic and technical ap-
proach, even though it may result in a decision in a particular case that
appears fair, should be abandoned.
The inquiry in each instance should focus on whether allowing or
disallowing a homestead claim is in consonance with the underlying
object and policy of the homestead law.69 If the object and policy is to
protect the debtor's home, then the debtor's interest, however ephem-
eral, novel, or difficult to classify under traditional property concepts
should be protected. This approach would not give creditors any just
complaint. In all situations where the homestead law's protection is
applicable, the creditor has a valid, but unenforceable, claim against
the debtor's property. Homestead laws protect the debtor's property
from these legally recognized and otherwise fully enforceable claims of
creditors.
Obviously, it would be most advantageous to creditors if all their
debtors had a fee simple absolute interest in property which was subject
65. Oree v. Gage, 38 Cal. App. 212, 175 P. 799 (1918) (mother holding property in trust for
daughter could not declare a homestead in it); Rice v. Rice, 108 Ill. 199 (1883). But see Furman v.
Brewer, 38 Cal. App. 687, 177 P. 495 (1918) wherein a trustee in actual possession and having a
beneficial interest was entitled to claim a homestead.
66. Annot., 89 A.L.R. 511, 518-19 (1934); Annot., 74 A.L.R.2d 1355, 1383 (1975).
67. Hill v. First Nat'l Bank, 73 Fla. 1092, 1101, 75 So. 614, 617 (1917).
68. Concerning homestead claims of future interest holders, see text accompanying note 45
srupra.
69. Haskins, supra note 17, at 1294-95.
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to execution. Execution on and sale of that kind of property would
bring the highest dollar to the creditor. But it is this very debtor whose
property is already indisputably within the homestead law's protection
and outside the creditor's grasp. The debtor who owns less than the
totality of the interest is probably more in need of protection. Yet it is
this debtor's interest which falls into the gray area created by conflict-
ing case law and ambiguous statutory language.
Applying a policy-oriented approach (that is, looking to the pur-
pose of the legislation) in determining whether a debtor could claim the
protection of the homestead laws would bring more predictability of
results to the benefit both of debtors and creditors. A debtor's expecta-
tion that his or her "home" was beyond the reach of creditors would be
fulfilled.7" Creditor's expectations would not be defeated because they
would know from the outset that the debtor's "home" was immune.
Creditors have no complaint when a debtor with less than a fee is
placed on a par with the debtor who is fortunate enough to own the
whole7 and is. allowed a piece of land free from levy. The courts un-
necessarily search for a way of assigning a particular name to the inter-
est under consideration. It is just as unnecessary to allow the decision
to flow from the name assigned. All that need be done to resolve the
homestead issue for cooperative apartments is to determine whether the
debtor's apartment is his or her home. If so, the property would be
protected. The decisions should turn not on technical classifications,
but on the underlying premise of homestead laws-protection of the
debtor's home.
IV. COOPERATIVE APARTMENTS
Despite a plethora of court decisions, law review articles, and vari-
ous statutory schemes, the cooperative apartment remains a misunder-
stood legal orphan. This orphan has been housed in foster homes in
nearly every area of property law. Depending upon the context in
70. The utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham believed that "[tihe idea of property con-
sists in an established expectation; in persuasion of being able to draw such or such an advantage
from the thing possessed, according to the nature of the case." J. BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLA-
TION 112 (2d ed. R. Hildreth 1871). This expectation is the work of law because there is no
property without law. When the law adopts objects which it promises to protect as property, it
gives rise to expectations which should not be upset. Although addressing legislators, Bentham's
thoughts have equal importance for the judiciary.
As regards property, security consists in receiving no check, no shock, no derangement to
the expectation founded on the laws, of enjoying such and such a portion of good. The
legislator owes the greatest respect to this expectation which he has himself produced. When
he does not contradict it, he does what is essential to the happiness of society; when he dis-
turbs it, he always produces a proportionate sum of evil.
Id. at 113.
71. J. SMYTH, supra note 10, at 137. The author was specifically addressing the irrecon-
ciliability of the construction of homestead laws denying joint tenants and tenants in common the
homestead protection while allowing a wrongful possessor to claim its benefits. The thought, how-
ever, is equally persuasive in the situation of the denial of homestead protection to cooperators in
stock-owned cooperative apartments.
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which the problem arises, the cooperative owner can find his or her
interest defined as one in real property, 72 personal property, 73 quasi-
real property, 74 a leasehold,75 and, finally, something more than a
leasehold, but less than a fee.76 This section will review the history of
the stock cooperative, explain its organization, and review the treat-
ment it has received in the courts and law journals.
A. History
The economic realities of home ownership in large urban areas
encouraged the development of cooperative housing corporations.77 As
the quantity of city property desirable and suitable for residential pur-
poses decreased, the price of the property increased. Thus, single-fam-
ily housing became prohibitively expensive. Utilizing the corporate
fiction, 78 however, aspiring home owners discovered that they could ec-
onomically approximate traditional home ownership in multi-family
dwellings.7 9
The move to cooperative ownership began early. According to
one chronicler, cooperative apartments began in 18th century France,
and appeared mi England in the next century. 0 In 1882, the Barrington
Apartment Association, probably the earliest American cooperative,
was organized in New York City.8 ' The fashionable or luxury cooper-
72. In re Estate of Pitts, 218 Cal. 184, 22 P.2d 694 (1933).
73. In re Miller's Estate, 205 Misc. 770, 130 N.Y.S.2d 295 (S. Ct. 1954).
74. Suskind v. 1136 Tenants Corp., 43 Misc. 2d 588, 251 N.Y.S.2d 321 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1964).
75. Carden Hall, Inc. v. George, 56 Misc. 2d 865, 290 N.Y.S.2d 430 (S. Ct. 1968).
76. Isaacs, "To Buy or Not to Buy" That is the Question"... What is a Cooperative
Apartment? 13 REC. N.Y. CITY B.A. 203, 205 (1958).
77. For the most part, the cases and articles cited herein are concerned with privately-
financed cooperatives. Government-financed low and middle income cooperatives are different
only in the subsidies allowed sponsors and the income ceilings imposed on tenant stockholders.
D. CLURMAN & E. HEBARD, CONDOMINIUMS AND COOPERATIVES 166 (1970). See also Note,
Cooperative Apartments in Government Assisted Low-Middle Income Housing, 111 U. PA. L. REV.
638 (1963).
78. Cooperative ownership can be structured in at least three other ways-a joint tenancy, a
tenancy in common, or a trust arrangement. Each of these forms has disadvantages which make it
inferior to the stock corporation cooperative.
A joint tenancy, where all tenants own the entire premises as co-owners in fee simple, is not
practical because of the difficulties presented by the four unities, the lack of divisability, and the
ability of joint tenants to create tenancies in common by intervivos gifts.
Problems presented by tenancies in common revolve mainly around difficulties in enforcing
financial obligation arrangements. When each tenant owns an undivided interest, the individual
apartments are unmarketable, and each owner faces unlimited liability in damage suits.
In the trust form, a popular device in Illinois, an express trust is created, and title to the
building is conveyed to a trustee who issues certificates of beneficial interest to the individual
apartment owners. The rights of the beneficiaries are governed by a declaration of trust, but
apartment owners must relinquish control of the building or expose themselves to the liabilities of
a partnership. Comment, A Survey of the Legal Aspects of Cooperative Apartment Ownership, 16
U. MIAMI L. REV. 305, 306-31 (1961). See also 2 P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, COOPERATIVE Hous-
ING LAW AND PRACTICE § 2.01[21-[3] (1978), and Mixon, supra note 40, at 228.
79. Isaacs, supra note 76, at 203.
80. McCullough, Cooperative Apartments in Illinois, 26 CHI. KENT L. REV. 303, 304 (1948).
81. Isaacs, supra note 76, at 209.
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ative, largely an American development, had appeared in New York
City by 1914.82 Not until the housing shortage following World War I,
however, did cooperative housing become common and popular.8 3 The
number of cooperative projects continued to increase until the Depres-
sion. Due to the financial interdependence peculiar to cooperative
ownership, 75% of those operating during the Depression years failed.8 4
Following World War II, the tight housing markets in large cities again
caused a resurgence in this form of ownership. 5
The historical development of the cooperative apartment reflects
the development of the legal concepts which now underlie modem co-
operative law.8 6 Generally, this law has developed piecemeal. Thus,
few unqualified statements about the cooperative or the nature of the
individual cooperator's interest are possible, except the statement that
the law does not necessarily reflect the expectations of an individual
cooperative owner.
B. Organization and Operation of the Cooperative
A cooperative venture begins when a project sponsor decides to
build a new apartment building or to reorganize an existing rental
property.87 The sponsor conveys title to the land (unless the property is
only leased) and building to a cooperative corporation, usually in the
name of the apartment house. Shares of stock in the new corporation
are allocated to each apartment and sold to the apartment "purchaser."
The price range of the apartments in each cooperative is determined by
the location and desirability of the building, and each apartment is in-
dividually priced according to its relative desirability, size, and loca-
tion. The mortgage status of the building determines each purchaser's
actual cash outlay. A highly mortgaged building will demand a smaller
original investment per apartment than will a building with little or no
outstanding mortgage indebtedness.88
Mere ownership of shares confers no right to occupy a cooperative
82. McCullough, supra note 80, at 305. These luxury apartments now sell for hundreds of
thousands of dollars.
83. Isaacs, supra note 76, at 210.
84. Mixon, supra note 40, at 229.
85. Cooperative apartments are not subject to rent control and therefore offered landlords in
the house-hungry 1940's a sometimes profitable way of increasing rent. See text accompanying
notes 174-76 infra for a discussion of statutory control of these excesses. On the more positive
side, for those who could not find or afford single family homes or vacant apartments, coopera-
tives offered an iron clad lease for an apartment in a well-maintained building.
86. Unlike condominiums, cooperatives were not created by comprehensive statutes. The
focus of this article is on treatment by the courts in the absence of applicable statutes.
87. See Marks & Marks, Coercive Aspects of Housing Cooperatives, 42 ILL. L. REV. 728
(1948) for critical appraisal of "forced" cooperation, that is, cooperatives organized by landlords
of existing rental properties.
88. For a more detailed examination of the development, financing, and operation of the
cooperative corporation than is undertaken in this article, see 2 P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, supra
note 78, at §§ 2.02-16.04. See also D. CLURMAN & E. HEBARD, supra note 77, at 199.
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apartment. 89 These shares do, however, entitle the purchaser to a long-
term9° proprietary lease9 for the rooms or apartment represented by
the shares. When all shares in the corporation are sold, the owner-
occupiers of the apartments constitute the shareholders of the coopera-
tive corporation.
Although the specific arrangements may vary, a true cooperative
evidences eight characteristics.92 First, "[t]he plan of ownership must
provide for the use of all apartments in the building for dwelling pur-
poses by the stockholders of the owning corporation." ' Courts will
invalidate a cooperative venture if the evidence suggests that some
apartments are reserved by the project sponsor or sold to other non-
resident investors for speculation.94 Unless prohibited by the proprie-
tary lease, however, individual owners may sublet their apartments for
profit.95
Second, "[tlhe expenses of operating and maintaining common
portions of the property (as well as paying taxes and mortgage charges)
must be shared by all cooperative owners in an equitable fashion."96
The "rent" which cooperators pay generally consists of a fixed annual
sum based on mortgage and operating expenses;97 a fixed sum collected
for a reserve account used to carry defaulting cooperators or to buy
back corporate shares; and a sum which may be levied if the cooperator
89. 2 P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, supra note 78, at § 2.01[4].
90. Under the lease, tenants cannot be ousted from the building except for failure to pay
assessments or for flagrant violations of house rules. See cases cited at notes 124-25 infra.
Although proprietary leases have been drawn to run year to year, the security of the long-
term lease has made it the preferred form. Most modem leases run from 20 to 50 years and have
automatic renewal clauses. Most leases now have clauses which allow cooperators to cancel, a
major departure from the early cooperative's ninety-nine year noncancellable leases. Comment,
supra note 78, at 312 n.52.
91. A stockholder is not the owner of the corporate property, even if he owns all of the
stock, hence he would not be entitled to use and occupy the premises merely by reason of his
ownership of the shares. . . .Thus the proprietary lease is the veryfoundation ofthe coopera-
tive arrangement; the ownership of the shares of stock ...being important chiefly because
they enable one to obtain a proprietary lease entitling the lessee to occupy a given amount of
living space or a specific apartment.
McCullough, supra note 80, at 315-16 (emphasis added). Generally, ownership of the stock and
the lease cannot be separated. But see Jackson Heights Courts, Inc. v. 171 24th St., Jackson
Heights, Inc., 299 N.Y. 650, 83 N.Y.S.2d 424 (1948), where the court held stock ownership and
lease duties separate and distinct.
92. Isaacs, supra note 76, at 211. To evict tenants who refuse to join the cooperative and to
ensure that cooperators benefit from tax rules, the cooperative must be organized correctly. See
text accompanying note 127 infra.
93. Id.
94. In People ex rel. McGoldrick v. Sterling, 283 App. Div. 88, 126 N.Y.S.2d 803 (1953), the
court held that if 13 of 32 apartments were reserved for speculation purposes, a true cooperative
had not been organized, and new owners could not evict statutory tenants.
State ex rel. Leavell v. Nelson, 63 Wash. 2d 299, 387 P.2d 82 (1963) invalidated a project
because of the sponsor's attempt to control the board of directors. He sublet his reserved apart-
ments to friendly speculators and by so doing retained landlord control over the other owner-
occupiers.
95. See text accompanying notes 132-42 infra for tax repercussions.
96. Isaacs, supra note 76, at 213.
97. Operating expenses may include the cost of utilities, upkeep of common areas, and any
other amenities which the cooperative offers.
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fails to maintain his or her apartment. Each share of stock is charged
its prorata share of the total annual expense, and each owner pays that
proportion which his or her holdings bear to the total.
98
Third, control of the management, operation, and maintenance of
the building must lie with those who occupy the building.99 In practice,
the cooperators usually elect a Board of Directors to establish and en-
force house rules'" that are incorporated by reference in the proprie-
tary lease. House rules cover the minutiae necessary to maintain peace
and living standards in the multi-family dwellings. Some cooperatives
hire professional managers to perform the same functions as the Board.
Fourth, "[tihe determination of who shall become an owner or oc-
cupant of an apartment must be within the control of those who own
and occupy the other apartments."' 1 Unlike most investors, the coop-
erators do not have votes equal to the number of their shares in the
corporation, but rather the number of apartments they occupy. Each
apartment may cast one vote at shareholders' meetings. Cooperators
vote on some house rules and, more importantly, on acceptance of pro-
spective tenants. 102 With this veto option, cooperators can review the
financial position and general character of anyone attempting to join
the cooperative. In so doing, they attempt to protect themselves from
those who would be unable to pay the assessments. Upon the death of
a cooperator, his or her family is usually allowed to remain in occu-
pancy at least for a specified period as long as the "rent" is paid.'
0 3
The other tenant-stockholders retain the power to vote on anyone who
wishes to assume the decedent's lease.
Fifth, the property must be operated on a non-profit basis.'"
98. 2 P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, supra note 78, at § 2.01[41. The mortgage reduction payment
refers only to any mortgage outstanding against the building. If there are no mortgages, the coop-
erator would pay only his share of operation expenses. (Any personal loans negotiated by the
cooperator to pay the purchase price of the apartment are his or her responsibility.) See Paul
Laurence Dunbar Apts., Inc. v. Nelson, 136 Misc. 561, 241 N.Y.S. 354 (Mun. Ct. N.Y. 1930) which
held that the assessment for operating expenses, as well as the mortgage payment, equaled "rent"
for purposes of summary proceeding.
99. Isaacs, supra note 76, at 215.
100. In Lazar v. Knolls Coop. Section No. 2 Inc., 205 Misc. 748, 130 N.Y.S.2d 407 (Sup. Ct.
1954) the court allowed a group of stockholders to vote on the board before construction of the
apartment building was completed. Because the construction company and the cooperative's tem-
porary board were financially interdependent, the court agreed with the stockholders' claim that
the temporary board may have had interests adverse to theirs. See 2B P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN,
supra note 78, at Appendix E for sample lease and house rules.
101. Isaacs, supra note 76, at 218.
102. Sale of a cooperative apartment can follow one of three patterns: the shares of stock can
be transferred to a new purchaser and the lease assigned to that same person; the shares of stock
can be transferred to the new purchaser and the seller's lease surrendered to the landlord corpora-
tion, which then issues a new lease; the landlord corporation can buy back the shares of stock,
accept a surrender of the lease, and then find a new buyer. See Mixon, supra note 40, at 237. No
matter which form of transfer is used, the new buyer or sublessee must be approved by the other
cooperators.
103. McCullough, supra note 80, at 319. See text accompanying notes 163-73 infra for discus-
sion of restraint on alienation.
104. Isaacs, supra note 76, at 222.
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Courts have refused to invalidate a cooperative venture merely because
the project sponsor reaped a profit in its development. 0 5 Once in oper-
ation, however, the cooperative must not receive more than twenty per-
cent of its income from sources other than the cooperators'
payments."° Although some cooperatives lease first floor space to
commercial enterprises or professional offices, cooperatives must moni-
tor this practice carefully because serious tax consequences can follow
if rental income is too great. 107 Cooperative corporations, if properly
organized and operated, report no taxable income. Some states do clas-
sify them as corporations "doing business" for franchise tax pur-
poses. 108
Sixth, a super majority of the cooperators must determine any ma-
jor changes in the provisions of leases, by-laws, acceleration or addi-
tions to mortgages, or alterations in the building. 0 9 Some cooperatives
require two-thirds majorities to approve these actions, while others re-
quire complete agreement. Most importantly, only the cooperators can
decide when the building should be sold or the corporation liquidated.
Seventh, the price paid for the stock must bear a reasonable rela-
tionship to the value of the corporation's equity in the real estate. "0
And eighth, the plan must fulfill requirements of federal and state tax
laws so as to grant to cooperators the income tax deductions available
to cooperative owners. 1
The primary objective of any cooperator is "to combine the con-
venience of apartment dwelling with the economics of home owner-
105. See Gilligan v. Tishman Realty & Const. Co., Inc., 283 App. Div. 157, 126 N.Y.S.2d 813
(1953); Greiner v. Gershman, 20 Misc. 2d 697, 190 N.Y.S.2d 263 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
106. I.R.C. § 216(b)(l)(D).
107. See text accompanying notes 127-31 infra for tax status of the cooperative corporation
and text accompanying notes 132-42 infra for tax status of the cooperator.
108. Supporting this view are courts which find that cooperators are beneficiaries of the pro-
ject to which "numerous profitable advantages inure." Pine Grove Manor v. Director, Div. of
Taxation, 68 N.J. Super. 135, 151, 171 A.2d 676, 685 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1961).
Among the "benefits" found by the court were low-cost housing at monthly payments lower
than the prevailing rental market; mortgage amortization payments which increase the coopera-
tors' equity in the corporation assets; the chance to sell their apartment for a substantial profit if
the cooperative corporation does not exercise its buy-back option; the right to receive a share of
the final distribution of net assets of the corporation on liquidation; and an interest in the residual
receipts from washers, dryers, vending machines, etc. in the form of refunds or lower sales prices.
Accord, State v. Sweeney, 153 Ohio St. 66, 91 N.E.2d 13 (1950); Commonwealth v. 2101 Coop.,
Inc., 408 Pa. 24, 183 A.2d 325 (1962). Conlra, 50 E. 75th St. Corp. v. Comm'r, 78 F.2d 158 (2d Cir.
1935); Stafford Owners, Inc. v. United States, 39 F.2d 743 (Ct. Cl. 1930).
In United Hous. Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975), the Supreme Court dis-
missed similar arguments regarding "profit" by noting that many of the supposed "benefits" are
the same benefits received by individual homeowners.
109. Isaacs, supra note 76, at 223. These majorities can vary from 66% to 100%. See Jones v.
Sutton Place Corp., 23 Misc. 2d 197, 201 N.Y.S.2d 369, 371 (Sup. Ct. 1960) and Tompkins v. Hale,
172 Misc. 1071, 15 N.Y.S.2d 854, 856 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
110. Isaacs, supra note 76, at 224.
111. Isaacs, supra note 76, at 228. See text accompanying notes 127-31 infra for discussion of
tax requirements.
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ship."" 2 Beyond this objective, however, the cooperative offers several
advantages. The cooperator may acquire indicia of ownership of the
apartments, as well as of a proportionate share of the common areas.
Furthermore, cooperative ownership permits one to take advantage of
the economic principal of the corporation so that each member shares
the cost of the property and its management. Cooperatives also mini-
mize the risk of personal liability to members.' 
13
Unfortunately, several serious disadvantages also accompany co-
operative ownership. In addition to the general confusion over the na-
ture of his or her interest, 1 4 the cooperator faces a substantial cash
outlay even before occupying his or her apartment," 5 and may have
difficulty financing his or her purchase because savings and loan as-
sociations generally do not accept stock in a cooperative corporation as
security for a loan. 1 6 Furthermore, because cooperative stock is not
generally acceptable as collateral, the investment may be frozen.
1 7
The cooperator surrenders much of the sovereignty that the fee owner
enjoys,' 18 yet may encounter difficulty enforcing agreements and cove-
nants."' 9 Most seriously, the cooperator may be swept out in a foreclo-
sure, whether personally delinquent or not, if total assessment
collections do not cover mortgage payments.12
0
Once the proprietary lease is signed, the cooperator becomes a ten-
ant to the managers of the building. 12 ' The relationship between the
cooperative management and its members, however, is more than a
mere tenancy; it
is fiduciary in nature and the board of directors [is] bound, on the
one hand, to manage the affairs of the [cooperative] so as to carry
out its purposes to house its members in a comfortable and effi-
112. Mixon, supra note 40, at 227.
113. Comment, supra note 78, at 305. Not to be forgotten is the fact that ownership brings the
pride of ownership, and increases the care and maintenance given the property by all members.
Hennessey, Cooperative Apartments and Town Houses, 1956 U. ILL. L.F. 22, 23.
114. See text accompanying notes 144-201 infra for an extensive treatment of the nature of the
cooperator's interest.
115. Anderson, Cooperative Apartments in Florida: A LegalAnaysis, 12 U. MIAMI L. REV. 13,
14 (1957). Depending on the mortgage position of the building, the cooperator might have to pay
the total purchase price in cash at one time.
116. Note, Cooperative Apartment Housing, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1407, 1412-14 (1948). See
Goldstein, Institutional Purchase Money Financing of Cooperative Apartments, 46 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 632 (1972).
117. Anderson, supra note 115, at 14.
118. Id. See text accompanying notes 121-26 infra for an explanation of the peculiar land-
lord-tenant relationship between a cooperator and his apartment corporation.
119. Johnson, Legal Problems ofCooperative Housing in Illinois, 50 ILL. B.J. 940, 943 (1961).
120. Mixon, supra note 40, at 228. For this reason a cooperator cannot safely make advance
payments on his or her share of the indebtedness. Any such prepayment would only increase his
equity in the corporate assets, and thereby give him a larger share of the proceeds, if any, of a
foreclosure sale. See also 2 P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, supra note 78, at § 2.01141[c].
121. Brigham Park Coop. Section 4, Inc. v. Lieberman, 158 N.Y.S.2d 135, 136 (Mun. Ct. N.Y.
1956). See also 1990 7th Ave. Coop. Corp. v. Edwards, 133 Misc. 831, 234 N.Y.S. 82 (Sup. Ct.
1929).
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cient manner, and on the other hand, to treat its individual mem-
bers in a fair and equal way. The [tenants], too, [have] the
correlative duty to recognize that the co-operative enterprise must
be conducted with the objective of securing the greatest good for
the benefit of the membership.
1 2 2
In lawsuits to settle specific grievances of cooperators or cooperative
managers, courts unanimously have accepted management's right to
enforce reasonable house rules. 123 The cases split almost equally in de-
cisions for tenants and managers over the reasonableness of a variety of
rules. 24 Generally, courts will enforce any rule that works to the bene-
fit of the majority without causing undue hardship on any one mem-
ber. 1
25
In this area of grievances and rules enforcement, the court deci-
sions generally reflect the expectations of the cooperators. By volunta-
rily joining cooperatives, cooperators have agreed, sub silentio, to give
122. Vernon Manor Coop. Apts. v. Salatino, 15 Misc. 2d 491, 495, 178 N.Y.S.2d 895, 900-01
(Westchester County Ct. 1958) (citations omitted). Despite the logical reasoning of the Vernon
Manor court, other courts have felt compelled to buttress their landlord-tenant relationship deci-
sions with further definition. In the interest of "substantial justice" (protection of cooperators
from arbitrary corporation rules), courts have supported their verdicts with inapplicable reason-
ing.
For example, the New York courts, in Susskind v. 1136 Tenants Corp., 43 Misc. 2d 588, 251
N.Y.S.2d 321 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1964) and Carden Hall, Inc. v. George, 56 Misc. 2d 865, 290 N.Y.S.2d
430 (Sup. Ct. 1968) cited estate cases for the proposition that cooperators are mere lessees and
therefore protected by the rules set forth in the lease.- On the other hand, the same court, in
Mutual Redevelopment Houses, Inc. v. Hanft, 42 Misc. 2d 1044, 249 N.Y.S.2d 988 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.
1964), denied the plaintiffs contention that defendants were mere lessees standing at arm's length
in the landl6rd-tenant relationship. The court held that because the defendants had purchased
stock in the corporation, they had received a proprietary lease that gave them more control of the
workings of the cooperative. (The cooperators in Susskind did not have to pay for fixing warped
boards in their bedroom floor, the plaintiff in Carden Hall was allowed to keep his dishwasher and
washing machine; and the plaintiffs in Hanti were allowed to keep their dog).
123. "The question... is not one of power, but one of reasonableness." Linden Hall No. 3
Coop. Corp. v. Burkman, 61 Misc. 2d 275, 277, 305 N.Y.S.2d 623, 625 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
124. For tenants:
E.g., Opoliner v. Joint Queensview Hous. Enterprise, Inc., 11 App. Div. 2d 1076, 206
N.Y.S.2d 681 (1960); Carden Hall, Inc. v. George, 56 Misc. 2d 865, 290 N.Y.S.2d 430 (Sup. Ct.
1968); Justice Court Mut. Hous. Coop., Inc. v. Sandow, 50 Misc. 2d 541, 270 N.Y.S.2d 829 (Sup.
Ct. 1966); Valentine Gardens Coop., Inc. v. Oberman, 237 N.Y.S.2d 535 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
For landlords:
E.g., Forest Park Coop. Inc. v. Hellman, 2 Misc. 2d 183, 152 N.Y.S.2d 685 (Sup. Ct. 1956);
Oberfest v. 300 West End Ave. Assocs. Corp., 34 Misc. 2d 963, 231 N.Y.S.2d 863 (Sup. Ct. 1962);
Hilltop Village Coop. No. 4, Inc. v. Goldstein, 43 Misc. 2d 657, 252 N.Y.S.2d 7 (Sup. Ct. 1964);
Luna Park Hous. v. Besser, 38 App. Div. 2d 713, 329 N.Y.S.2d 332 (1972); Southbridge Towers,
Inc. v. Rovics, 76 Misc. 2d 396, 350 N.Y.S.2d 62 (Sup. Ct. 1973); Vernon Manor Coop. Apts. v.
Salatino, 15 Misc. 2d 491, 178 N.Y.S.2d 895 (Westchester County Ct. 1958).
125. For example, in Logan v. 3750 North Lake Shore Drive Inc., 17 II. App. 3d 584, 308
N.E.2d 278 (1974), the court held that the board could not refuse plaintiffs request to sublet her
apartment. Subleases were permitted under the lease and the board, in trying to initiate a general
policy against subleasing, was acting unreasonably. In Baum v. Ryerson Towers, 55 Misc. 2d
1045, 287 N.Y.S.2d 791 (Sup. Ct. 1968), on the other hand, the court allowed the defendant board
to change the hours during which the community room could be used. The plaintiffs claimed they
were denied the "quiet enjoyment" granted by the lease, but the court noted that any benefit to the
plaintiffs (from an injunction) would be outweighed by harm done to the other cooperators.
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up some freedom of activity in exchange for economical housing and
congenial neighbors. Because cooperators have some say in promul-
gating house rules, however, they may protect themselves from the va-
garies of arbitrary landlords. Thus, as one author has noted, "while the
cooperative tenant is still a renter. . . he and the other tenants own the
landlord."' 26
C. Tax Treatment of Cooperatives
If the cooperative is to be truly competitive with single-family resi-
dences, the cooperative owner must be able to take advantage of tax
benefits equivalent to those afforded the owners of single-family resi-
dences. The cooperative corporation must satisfy the requirements of
IRC section 216(b)(1) if cooperators are to qualify for certain federal
income tax benefits. The corporation must (1), have only one class of
outstanding stock; (2), be owned by stockholders who are entitled,
solely by reason of their stock ownership, to dwell in an apartment in a
building owned by the corporation; (3), include no stockholder who is
entitled to receive any distribution not out of earnings and profits of the
corporation except on a complete or partial liquidation of the corpora-
tion; and (4), derive 80% or more of its gross income for the taxable
year from tenant-cooperators.1
27
Cooperative management may experience difficulty with the
eighty percent gross income requirement. In Eckstein v. United
States, 28 the Court of Claims reaffirmed the rule that amounts paid by
proprietary lessees are contributions to capital and do not constitute
income to the corporation. The management is responsible to see that
any income received from rented commercial offices or building vend-
ing machines does not exceed 20% of gross income. 129 Though cooper-
ative corporations can easily qualify under section 216 if properly
organized, too much extraneous income will defeat the cooperative's
tax advantages.
Problems may arise under requirements (3) and (4) above if the
corporation maintains a large reserve account each year. If the corpo-
ration retains funds to apply in the next period instead of returning
those funds to cooperators, a portion will be subject to taxation.
30
When reserves or monies paid in excess of actual expenses are refunded
on the basis of patronage, those refunds are not considered income to
cooperators, but return of overcharge. If, however, refunds are distrib-
uted on the basis of the ownership of stock, and as earnings on capital
126. Mixon, supra note 40, at 228.
127. I.R.C. § 216(b)(1)(A)-(D).
128. 452 F.2d 1036 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
129. The 20% gross income may be offset by operating expenses to reduce net income to zero
for any taxable year. Anderson, supra note 115, at 29.
130. Comment, supra note 78, at 313 n.58.
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investment, the refunds are taxable income.' 31
If a cooperative unit satisfies the requirements in IRC section
216(b)(1), the cooperator 32 may deduct a proportionate share of real
estate taxes and interest on any mortgage.t1 3  Cooperators are also enti-
tled to postpone recognition of capital gains on the sale of their apart-
ments by reinvesting in a new residence.
134
Unlike taxpayers who own a single-family residence, cooperators
may not deduct casualty losses, because section 216 makes no provision
for such treatment. 135 Furthermore, losses on cooperative stock are not
treated as capital losses. In Stewart v. Commissioner, 36 the court disal-
lowed the taxpayer's claim of a substantial loss deduction on the sale of
his cooperative stock because the taxpayer could not prove that he had
purchased his apartment for any purpose other than use as a resi-
dence.' 37  In Peake v. Commissioner, 38 however, a taxpayer who
proved that she purchased her stock for subleasing purposes was al-
lowed a long-term capital loss on the stock.
The Internal Revenue Service consistently has declined to exempt
cooperators from gift tax liability 39 pursuant to IRC section 2515
which provides that the creation between husband and wife of a joint
tenancy or a tenancy by the entirety in real property shall not be a
transfer of property for federal gift tax purposes unless the taxpayers
elect to treat it as such. In ruling that cooperators do not qualify for
this exemption, the Commissioner has explained that Congress did not
intend to modify the common law meaning of"real estate," and thus
did not intend to include cooperative interests within the scope of sec-
131. Yourman, Some Legal Aspects of Cooperative Housing, 12 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 126,
135 (1947).
132. I.R.C. § 216(b)(2) defines a cooperator as
[One] whose stock is fully paid up in an amount not less than an amount shown ... as
bearing a reasonable relationship to the portion of the value of the corporation's equity in the
houses or apartment building and the land on which situated which is attributable to the
house or apartment which such individual is entitled to occupy.
If its members are to qualify under this section, the cooperative corporation cannot sell shares for
more than a nominal price if its assets are heavily mortgaged.
133. I.R.C. § 216(a)(1) (real estate taxes); id. § 216(a)(2)(A)-(B) (mortgage interest). These
sections do not cover any tax or interest related to space rented to non-members or due for cooper-
atives constructed on a leasehold. Note, Condominium and Cooperative Housing.- Taxation by
State and Federal Governments, 21 U. FLA. L. REV. 529, 537, 539 (1969). See also Comment,
supra note 78, at 313.
134. I.R.C. §§ 1034(0, 121(d)(3).
In determining the amount reinvested, the cost of the next residence will include the amount
paid for the stock and the portion of the mortgage allocated to the apartment. Rev. Rul. 60-76,
1960 - I C.B. 296.
135. Anderson, supra note 115, at 32. See also Note, Land Without Earth-The
Condominium, 15 U. FLA. L. REV. 203, 217 (1962).
136. 5 T.C.M. (CCH) 229 (1946).
137. See also Barnum v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 401 (1952); Calder v. Commissioner, 16 T.C.
144 (1951).
138. 10 T.C.M. (CCH) 577 (1951).
139. See Roth, The Federal Gi Tax and Joint Ownership of Condominum and Cooperative
Apartments, 52 A.B.A. J. 587 (1966).
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tion 2515. 4o
Although IRC section 216 treats cooperators in part as real prop-
erty owners and allows them substantial advantages over ordinary rent-
ers, those advantages are not coextensive with the advantages enjoyed
by homeowners. Any tax advantages that cooperators do enjoy are
limited strictly by the actions of Congress. 141 In general, the courts
have been hesitant to extend the tax advantages given to coopera-
tives. 142 Moreover, tax decisions involving cooperatives may have im-
pact beyond the immediate area of cooperative taxation. A court that
seeks to treat the cooperative interest as an interest in real property may
support its decision by citing relevant tax cases. Conversely, courts that
focus on the tenancy element in cooperative ownership rarely cite tax
decisions to support their reasoning.
143
D. The Nature of the Cooperator's Interest
Scholars generally agree that the cooperator's shares of stock and
proprietary lease do not constitute an interest in real property. It is
typically stated that the cooperator owns only shares of stock that enti-
tle him or her to lease the premises for occupancy. Nevertheless, the
cooperator still pays "rent" as a "tenant."" Judges who agree with
140. Rev. Rul. 66-40, 1966-1 C.B. 227.
141. State legislators, too, afford tax advantages to cooperators. An interesting example of
statutory reform on the state level is the issue of the cooperator's qualification for state homestead
tax exemptions. Prior to 1969, Florida courts had construed the exemption (FLA. CONST. art. 10,
§ 7) to apply to any one building, no matter how many owners had homes in the building. There-
fore, owners of duplexes and condominiums were allowed to take only their proportionate share
of the $5,000 tax exemption. Cooperators, according to the attorney general, could not even qual-
ify for a proportionate share because under the corporate form, legal and equitable title is vested
in the corporation, and the interest of the apartment owner is that of a stockholder; because that
interest is personalty, no exemption would be allowed. [1961-1962] FLA. ATr'Y GEN. BIENNIAL
REP. 238 (Op. No. 061-143). In 1969, the Florida legislature specifically extended the total exemp-
tion to condominium and cooperative owners. 1967 Fla. Laws, ch. 67-339 (1969). See Ammer-
man v. Markham, 222 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 1969).
A Georgia court, faced with a similar constitutional exemption (GA. CONST. § 2-4604 (art.
VII, § 1, para. IV)) and a similar legislative extention to cooperators (GA. CODE ANN. § 92-233(b)
(1974)) arrived at the opposite conclusion. The court held although members did possess some
characteristics of ownership, they occupied under a lease which established a landlord-tenant rela-
tionship. They were not, therefore, included in the constitutional definition ("each homestead
. . .actually occupied by the owner as resident...") and could not be so included by an act of
the legislature. Brandywine Town, Inc. v. Joint City-County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 231 Ga. 585,
203 S.E.2d 222 (1974).
142. See, e.g., Borland v. Commissioner, 123 F.2d 358 (7th Cir. 1941) (upholding tax deduc-
tions taken by member of cooperative organized under trust form). In Borland, the court com-
mented, "[wihile the applicable principle of law is settled and is grounded on sound reason, its
application to the hybrid and anomalous legal situation as here exists [a cooperative] is somewhat
puzzling." Id. at 360.
143. For contrasting interpretations of the importance of the cooperator's tax breaks, compare
Justus v. Bowers, 167 Ohio St. 384, 148 N.E.2d 917 (1958) and Application of Berger, 23 Misc. 2d
553, 198 N.Y.S.2d 187 (Sup. Ct. 1960) with Danforth v. McGoldrick, 201 Misc. 480, 109 N.Y.S.2d
387 (Sup. Ct. 1951) and Brandywine Townhouses, Inc. v. Joint City-County Bd. of Tax Asses-
sors, 231 Ga. 585, 203 S.E.2d 222 (1974).
144. McCullough, supra note 80, at 310. See also H. LESAR, LANDLORD AND TENANT § 310,
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these scholars assert, for example, that "it is the shares in the corpora-
tion that are sold, and despite a vernacular usage to the contrary, the
apartment is not sold, but leased under a so-called 'proprietary'
lease."' 45 This rationale characterizes the cooperator's property inter-
est first as a valuable right to the use of real property rather than an
interest in it;' 4 6 and second as personalty, with stock ownership as a
prerequisite for obtaining a lease. 47 Courts that have not accepted this
line of reasoning have been accused of adhering to unsound concepts
and creating confusion.
48
In contrast, courts promulgating this "confusion" have found that
a cooperator does own his or her apartment. In Tudor Arms Apartments
v. Shaffer,'49 for example, the court reasoned that
the solution cannot turn upon the form of the transaction ...
[T]he essence of the transaction is that in exchange for a capital
investment, a prospective purchaser will obtain a right. . . to oc-
cupy a particular unit for an indefinite period, during good beha-
viour. When all the stock is disposed of, the promoters will be out
of the picture and the management will be in the hands of the
stockholders. These are some of the most important indicia of
ownership. 
150
In Silverman v. Alcoa Plaza Associates,'5 ' a dissenting justice noted that
concepts of realty and personalty were developed before cooperatives
existed, and reasoned that "guidelines to classification should be estab-
lished by the inherent nature of the property right rather than mere
superficial resemblances to other forms."'' 52 In sum, these courts have
held that while a cooperator does not acquire a fee in the apartment,
the cooperator does possess, via the stock and proprietary lease, so
many rights and obligations characteristic of fee ownership that the two
are for practical purposes indistinguishable.' 53
Another argument for classifying the cooperator's interest as own-
at 200 (1957); 2 P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, supra note 78, at § 2.0115]; Isaacs, supra note 76, at 207;
Comment, supra note 78, at 316.
145. People ex rel. McGoldrick v. Sterling, 283 App. Div. 88, 93, 126 N.Y.S.2d 803, 808
(1953). "[Plaintiffs] are not owners but third parties having distinct rights against and distinct
obligations toward the defendant owners." Susskind v. 1136 Tenants Corp., 43 Misc. 2d 588, 591,
251 N.Y.S.2d 321, 326 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1964).
146. 2 P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, supra note 78, at § 1.03 n.3.
147. Susskind v. 1136 Tenants Corp., 43 Misc. 2d 588, 591, 251 N.Y.S.2d 321, 326 (Civ. Ct.
N.Y. 1964). See also Silverman v. Alcoa Plaza Assoc., 37 App. Div. 2d 166, 172, 323 N.Y.S.2d 39,
45 (1971): "It thus appears that a proprietary lease is no different from any other type of lease. It
is personal property." (Cooperator's lease and stock are goods under UCC.)
148. 2 P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, supra note 78, at § 1.03.
149. 191 Md. 342, 62 A.2d 346 (1948).
150. Id. at 348, 62 A.2d at 348 (emphasis added).
151. 37 App. Div. 2d 166, 323 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1971).
152. Id. at 173, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 46 (Stever, J., dissenting).
153. See also Glennon v. Butler, 66 A.2d 519 (D.C. 1949); R. KRATOVIL, REAL ESTATE LAW
§ 549 (5th ed. 1969). One author claims that authority exists even for the proposition that a share-
holder has an insurable interest in the corporate assets. Rohan, Cooperative Housing: The Treat-
men! of Casualty Losses, Insurance and Project Termination, 2 CAL. WEST L. REV. 70, 76 (1966).
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ership of real property supports this "indicia of ownership" viewpoint.
This argument is based on the assertion that the cooperator has a more
direct interest in the real property assets of the corporation than would
an ordinary stockholder. At any point, the cooperator knows not only
the value of his or her share of the corporate assets, but also the real
property source of that value.' 54 This argument probably reflects the
understanding of a cooperative apartment purchaser who sees him or
herself as a home buyer, and not as a tenant.
Cooperatives are not only creatures of statute. They are also ag-
glomerations of legal concepts that are at times contradictory.'55
Courts have tended to focus separately on two distinguishing character-
istics-the shares and the lease-and to build their decisions on the
traditional law of each of these interests. After classifying each interest
separately as personalty, the courts then define the whole as personalty.
By splitting cooperative ownership into separate parts, however, the
courts have based their decisions on inappropriate criteria. To develop
any coherent definition of the cooperator's interest, the courts should
instead incorporate the policy behind cooperatives-shared ownership
of real property-into the rules affecting the consequences of coopera-
tive ownership. 56 A survey of the treatment of cooperative ownership
in several areas of the law indicates that this coherency is currently in
short supply.
. The Cooperative Interest in Estates
In re Estate of Pills, 57 a 1933 California case, demonstrates one
manner in which this coherency can be created: by dealing with the
cooperator's interest for estate purposes in a substantive, rather than a
superficial, way. In ruling that the cooperative corporation had a lien
on the deceased's shares in the cooperative, the court stated:
While the corporation held the legal title, yet, to all intents and
purposes, the entire equitable estate was distributed proportion-
ately among the owners of the apartments. It is unnecessary to
assign a name to the interest thus created. It is sufficient for the
154. Note, Legal Characterization of the Individual's Interest in a Cooperative Apartment: Re-
alty or Personaity, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 250, 254 n.32 (1973). The author indicates that this rela-
tionship may not give cooperators ownership because it i too similar to the rights of a
condominium owner. However, as the following net worth formula shows, the equity relationship
between the cooperator and his or her proportionate share of the corporate assets is very close. In
the formula, a cooperator's net worth equals
(a) the downpayment made by the member, plus
(b) the member's share of principal amortization on the mortgage, plus
(c) the member's share of surplus and reserve accounts, minus
(d) the member's share of depreciation of the corporate assets.
Pine Grove Manor 6 v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 68 N.J. Super. 135, 147, 171 A.2d 676, 683
(1961).
155. Isaacs, supra note 76, at 204.
156. See Note, supra note 154, at 256-58.
157. 218 Cal. 184, 22 P.2d 694 (1933).
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purposes of this case to conclude that the ownership of the apart-
ment constituted an interest in real property..
8
The majority viewpoint, however, is reflected by In re Miller's
Estate.59 In Miller, the testator had bequeathed "all real estate owned
by me" to his daughter. In construing the will, the court did not con-
sider the testator's intent. Instead, the court asked whether the testa-
tor's interests as shareholder and lessee of a cooperative might pass as
real estate under his will. Answering in the negative, the court rea-
soned: "Considered separately the shares of stock and the lease each
would be considered personalty for purposes of estate distribution...
.and the fact that the stock ownership is prerequisite to the procurement
of the lease would not seem to affect the legal classification of these
assets." 160
In contrast, one New York case, In re Estate of Rockwell, 16' did
permit a cooperative to pass as realty. The testator in Rockwell be-
queathed "any home of which I may die seized. . to may wife." Al-
though the testator and his wife jointly had purchased another home
after the will was executed, the court held that the only "home" to
which the testator could have been referring when he wrote his will was
his cooperative apartment.
62
If courts refuse to examine a testator's intent in construing the tes-
tator's language, as the Miller holding suggests, the families of many
cooperative owners may be unpleasantly surprised at the dispositive
results of a will that is not worded to devise the cooperative interest
specifically. This area of will construction presents the best example of
the courts' seeming inability to view the shares of stock and the lease as
merging to comprise a single and different form of ownership.
2. The Cooperative Interest for Restraint on Alienation of Stock
Cooperators' interests are subject to restraints on alienation. The
by-laws of the cooperative corporation and the proprietary leases pre-
scribe the procedures by which cooperative apartments can be sold, as-
158. Id. at 191, 22 P.2d at 697.
159. 205 Misc. 770, 130 N.Y.S.2d 295 (Surrogate Ct. N.Y. 1954).
160. Id. at 772, 130 N.Y.S.2d at 296. See also In re Turner's Estate, 36 Misc. 2d 684, 233
N.Y.S.2d 108 (Surrogate Ct. N.Y. 1962); In re Estate of Schlesinger, 22 Misc. 2d 810, 194
N.Y.S.2d 710 (Surrogate Ct. N.Y. 1959). In re Bloomingdale's Estate, 142 N.Y.S.2d 781 (Surro-
gate Ct. N.Y. 1955) held that, although the lease and shares of stock were personalty, they did not
pass under the article of the testator's will by which he gave all his "personal effects and belong-
ings" to his wife. Using the test "whether the articles are or are not used in or by the household or
for the benefit or comfort of the family," the court held that a $65,000 yacht and six automobiles
were personal belongings. It did not, however, apply that test to the testator's cooperative stock
and lease. Rather, it decided that while the lease was to be considered personalty, the shares of
stock had to be regarded as within the category of securities which the testator had bequeathed as
residuary property.
161. 26 Misc. 2d 709, 205 N.Y.S.2d 928 (Surrogate Ct. N.Y. 1960).
162. "This apartment was his home and the intent of the testator to give it to his wife is clear
and unmistakable." Id. at 711, 205 N.Y.S.2d at 930.
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signed, or subleased. These restrictive clauses permit cooperators to
exclude undesirable members'63 and to ensure that prospective tenants
have sufficiently secure financial resources to pay assessments.
64
The characterization of the cooperator's interest becomes impor-
tant when evaluating the validity of the restraints imposed by these re-
strictive provisions. If the interest in a cooperative is characterized as
ownership of real property, its alienability, by tradition, should be un-
fettered.' 65 If the interest is viewed substantially as a leasehold, how-
ever, valid restraints on alienation can be imposed.'66
Restraint clauses have generally been upheld for reasons such as
those articulated in the early case of Penthouse Properties v. 1158 5th
A venue, Inc.'6 7 In Penthouse Properties, the cooperator desired to as-
sign his ninety-nine-year lease without the permission of the corpora-
tion. In refusing to uphold such an assignment, the court noted that the
relationship of the tenant-stockholders in a cooperative apartment
house is not unlike a partnership. The financial responsibility of each
tenant is significant, and the failure of one tenant to pay his or her
share of the operating expenses increases the liability of the other ten-
ant-stockholders. This special characteristic of cooperative ownership
therefore requires the corporation to place some restraints on the sale
of stock, to protect the cooperative owners. 68 Later, in Wiesner v. 791
Park Avenue Corp.,169 the New York Court of Appeals limited this
seemingly blanket approval of restraints on alienation by finding that
such restraints were permissible, but only in the absence of statutory
standards that prohibited them.'7 Those statutory standards would in-
clude prohibitions against the denial of housing on the basis of sex,
race, color, creed, or national origin.
The best statement of the rule regarding restraints on the aliena-
tion of cooperative interests is found in Mowatt v. 1540 Lake Shore
Drive Corp., 71 in which the plaintiff had sued the cooperative corpora-
163. Note, supra note 116, at 1416.
164. Note, Cooperative Apartments-A Legal Hybrid, 13 U. FLA. L. REv. 123 (1960).
165. Id. at 126.
166. Note, supra note 116, at 1417-18. The author suggests that the nature of the cooperative,
both as an investment for the cooperator and as an important solution to housing problems, might
justify allowing some restraints. He finds a better reason to be "that the tenant owners' interest is
in several important respects less than a complete fee and should, therefore, be governed by the
usual rule that restraints on leases are valid." Id. at 1418.
167. 256 App. Div. 685, I1 N.Y.S.2d 417 (1939). See also 68 Beacon St., Inc. v. Sohier, 289
Mass. 354, 194 N.E. 303 (1935).
168. 256 App. Div. 685, 691-92, 11 N.Y.S.2d 417, 422-23 (1939).
169. 6 N.Y.2d 426, 160 N.E.2d 720, 190 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1959).
170. The court found that "[albsent the application of these statutory standards there is no
reason why the owners of the co-operative apartment house could not decide for themselves with
whom they wish to share their elevators, their common halls and facilities, their stockholder's
meetings, their management problems and responsibilities and their homes." Id. at 434, 160
N.E.2d at 724, 190 N.Y.S.2d at 75 (emphasis added).
171. 385 F.2d 135 (7th Cir. 1967) (applying Illinois law as found in Gale v. York Center
Comm. Coop., 21 111. 2d 86, 171 N.E.2d 30 (1961)).
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tion because the Board of Directors had failed to approve several of her
prospective subtenants. The defendant corporation claimed the same
full and arbitrary power to withhold consent to the transfers which any
landlord has. The court rejected this argument, noting that "[coopera-
tive apartment owners] do not live in a wholly communal manner, and
the freedom of each member-tenant to dispose of his property right
should be afforded protection. We do not think that absolute control
by the group can be justified."' 7 2 Although finding for the defendant,
the court concluded that "the requirement of consent in the case at bar
is valid if the power to withhold consent must be reasonably exercised
in the light of the purposes of the arrangement, and would be void if it
need not be."' 73
When deciding cases involving restraints on alienation, the courts
have found the cooperators to be more than mere tenants. To balance
the competing interests of the cooperator and the corporation, courts
have forged a reasonableness standard against which to measure the
actions of the cooperative management. The courts emphasize that co-
operators have traded their ability to sell their interest freely for the
power to protect their investments and to approve their prospective
neighbors. The exchange is fair to cooperators when this power of pro-
tection is constrained by the requirement that restraints be reasonable.
3. The Cooperative Interest for Eviction, Receivership, and
Foreclosure
a. Eviction
When veterans returned home after World War II, they found
housing in large cities like New York to be in short supply. Landlords
who took advantage of this situation by raising rents earned large
windfall profits. To prevent these profits and to protect tenants without
a lease, the federal government and some states imposed rent control.
To circumvent rent control, some landlords reorganized their rental
properties into cooperatives. The more unscrupulous apartment own-
ers used coercion, intimidation, and outright fraud to induce these stat-
utory tenants to "purchase" their apartments at grossly inflated prices.
Although passage of emergency measures in several jurisdictions 74 de-
172. 385 F.2d at 137.
173. Id See also Crossman v. Pease & Elliman Inc., 29 App. Div. 2d 4, 284 N.Y.S.2d 751
(1967).
174. See generally, Marks & Marks, supra note 87, at 728.
E.g., Housing & Rent Act, ch. 161, § 204, 62 Stat. 98 (1948); N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 8585
(McKinney 1974); NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE §§ 5 I-6.0c(9)(a) (McKinney 1974).
See Abbot v. Bralove, 176 F.2d 64 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Woods v. Krizan, 176 F.2d 667 (8th Cir.
1949); Richards v. Kaskel, 32 N.Y.2d-524, 347 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1973); Tuvim v. 10 E. 30 Corp., 32
N.Y.2d 541, 347 N.Y.S.2d 13 (1973); Van Vort v. 17 E. 84th St. Corp., 4 App. Div. 2d 483, 166
N.Y.S.2d 765 (1957); Golenpaul v. Frankel, 285 App. Div. 941, 138 N.Y.S.2d 708 (1955); Applica-
tion of Massey, 279 App. Div. 1090, 112 N.Y.S.2d 677 (1952); Judson v. Frankel, 279 App. Div.
372, 110 N.Y.S.2d 156 (1952); Whitmarsh v. Farnell, 273 App. Div. 584, 78 N.Y.S.2d 782 (1948);
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creased this form of fraud, those measures did not aid the bona fide
stranger who had been induced to purchase an already occupied apart-
ment in an authorized housing cooperative.
Thus a new issue concerning cooperatives required resolution:
whether the owner of a cooperative interest could use eviction proceed-
ings to eject the occupier of his or her apartment. Those who objected
to the coercive way that the landlords had formed cooperatives main-
tained that cooperative purchasers could not evict statutory tenants.
They argued that a shareholder is not an owner of corporate property;
that the landlord, not the tenant, is considered the fee owner for evic-
tion purposes; that the cooperator, who occupies the cooperative by vir-
tue of a lease, is merely another tenant who cannot bring any action
against statutory tenants.175 Authority exists for each of these argu-
ments; 76 nevertheless, the majority position reaches the opposite con-
clusion.
In Curtis v. Le May, 17 7 the court began, albeit tentatively, to define
the interest in these circumstances. That court decided that because
cooperators had to buy stock in the corporation and were assigned all
the corporation's rights and interests in the apartments for the term of
their leases, the cooperators were "considerably more than mere les-
sees."' 178 Two years later, in Hicks v. Bigelow,'79 a Washington, D.C.
court considered a similar eviction proceeding and held that although
the cooperative corporation and the cooperator were nominally land-
lord and tenant, the apartments were in substance "owner-occu-
pied."' 8 ° The court cataloged the cooperator's attributes of ownership
and concluded that "[tjo say that despite her investment in the coopera-
tive, and despite the privileges and prerogatives vested in her. . ., she
Shumann v. 250 Tenants Corp., 65 Misc. 2d 253, 317 N.Y.S.2d 500 (Sup. Ct. 1970); Application of
Hoenig, 115 N.Y.S.2d 913 (Sup. Ct. 1952), af'd sub nor. Hoenig v. McGoldrick, 281 App. Div.
663, 117 N.Y.S.2d 535 (1952); Mont Cenis Apts., Inc. v. Alexander, 120 Misc. 542, 199 N.Y.S. 69
(Sup. Ct. 1923); Ravitz v. Simetz, 115 Misc. 406, 188 N.Y.S. 402 (Sup. Ct. 1921).
175. Marks & Marks, supra note 87, at 746-47.
176. See People ex rel. McGoldrick v. Sterling, 283 App. Div. 88, 126 N.Y.S.2d 803 (1953);
Danforth v. McGoldrick, 201 Misc. 480, 109 N.Y.S.2d 387 (Sup. Ct. 1951); Braislin, Porter &
Baldwin, Inc. v. Sawdon, 68 N.Y.S.2d 774 (Justice's Ct. of Eastchester 1946).
177. 186 Misc. 853, 60 N.Y.S.2d 768 (Mun. Ct. N.Y. 1945). The cases discussed in the text are
only representative. See also 542 Morris Park Ave. Corp. v. Wilkins, 120 Misc. 48, 51, 197 N.Y.S.
625, 627 (Sup. Ct. 1922) ("In a corporation organized under a co-operative ownership plan, ...
the stockholders are in effect regarded as the owners of the rooms occupied or to be occupied by
them .... ); Kenny v. Thompson, 338 I11. App. 403, 87 N.E.2d 229 (1st Dist. 1949); Tudor Arms
Apts. v. Shaffer, 191 Md. 342, 62 A.2d 346 (1948); Flamman v. McGoldrick, 279 App. Div. 854,
110 N.Y.S.2d 477 (1952); Application of Berger, 23 Misc. 2d 553, 198 N.Y.S.2d 187 (Sup. Ct.
1960).
178. Curtis v. Le May, 186 Misc. 853, 856, 60 N.Y.S.2d 768, 770 (Mun. Ct. N.Y. 1945).
179. 55 A.2d 924 (D.C. 1947).
180. Id. at 926. The court noted that in Bigelow, the cooperator had most of the attributes of
an owner. Furthermore, she had a voice in the operation and management of the building and in




is barred from proceeding ... would be to disregard her rights."''
One year later, a New York court interpreting the rent control act
refused to issue a blanket ruling. It decided that "[tihe meaning of the
word 'title' as used in this statute [Business Rent Law] is to be gathered
from the context, . . . [and] [w]here the circumstances are such as to
warrant doing so, the courts. . . will pierce the corporate veil, looking
behind the corporate fiction."' 82 Looking behind that veil, the court
concluded that the intention of the rent act would be better served by
treating the parties involved as "the titleholders of their respective
spaces."' 1
83
Because they have refused to face squarely the issue of the cooper-
ator's interest in the property, courts are now forced to decide on a case
by case basis whether a cooperator qualifies as a landlord for eviction
purposes. Thus, a cooperator who purchases an already occupied
apartment could find his or her occupancy blocked by a court's refusal
of assistance. The courts may not recognize the occupancy right the
cooperator thought his or her substantial investment afforded.
b. Receivership
When cooperative apartment buildings have fallen into receiver-
ship, the courts have treated cooperators differently than owners of re-
alty with regard to liability for use and occupancy rates. In Prudence
Co. v. 160 West 73rd Street Corp.'84 the court held that cooperators did
have limited liability to receivers. The cooperator was liable for agreed
upon assessments, although not for the higher "use and occupancy"
rate set by the receiver. Because homeowners are not liable to receivers
at all, however, Prudence implies that in this respect cooperators are
not owners.
8 5
c. Liens and Foreclosures
The nature of the cooperator's interest has been determinative in
181. Id. Bigelow had invoked a provision of the Washington, D.C. Emergency Rent Act that
allowed a "landlord" personally desiring to occupy the property to evict a tenant.
182. Smith v. Feigin, 273 App. Div. 277, 280, 77 N.Y.S.2d 229, 232 (1948). The statute inter-
preted in this decision was the Business Rent Law. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 8558(d) (McKinney
1978).
183. Id.
184. 260 N.Y. 205, 183 N.E. 365 (1932).
185. See also Moses v. Boss, 72 F.2d 1005 (D.C. Cir. 1934). In Greenberg v. Colonial Studios,
105 N.Y.S.2d 494, rev'd, 279 App. Div. 555, 107 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1951), the lower court denied coop-
erators' contention that their liability to a receiver created a new landlord-tenant relationship
which entitled them to the benefit of the rent act. The court noted that since they were liable to
the receiver in the first place, they had not been owners, and the application of the receiver did not
change their situation. In a cryptic reversal, however, the appellate court held that the plaintiffs,
under the circumstances, should be treated as tenants protected by rent laws. Perhaps the court
was concluding that cooperative tenants are always beneficiaries of the rent act. Without benefit
of a court explanation, however, it seems that the application of a receiver somehow changes the
nature of the cooperator's relationship to the corporation.
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decisions in the areas of liens and foreclosures. In a tax lien case, La-
caile v. Feldman, 86 the court noted that the cooperator was more than
a mere lessee. Because of his or her liability for mortgage and tax pay-
ments on "leased" apartments and his or her entitlement to certain tax
deductions, the court concluded that the cooperative lessee's stock own-
ership was "collateral to and an implementation of the purposes of the
long-term lease."1 87 Thus, the court held that the tax warrants filed by
the New York State Tax Commission attached to the lease as liens
upon a chattel- or quasi-real property interest. The Lacaile court cited
several eviction cases in support if its "quasi-real" classification.
Lacaile is still the law in lien cases.
Cooperators faced with foreclosure proceedings on their buildings
have sometimes benefited and sometimes suffered from the classifica-
tion of their interest. For example, in New York Life Insurance Co. v.
1325 Astor Street Building Corp.,88 the plaintiff insurance company
claimed that the owners of the cooperative apartments were liable per-
sonally for the deficiency existing after sale pursuant to foreclosure of
the deed of trust. The company contended that the defendant coopera-
tors, as the purchasers of the property, were the real parties in interest.
In denying New York Life's claim and seeking to protect the coopera-
tors, the court held that the insurance company did business only with
the corporation and could not later claim that it had done business with
the individual cooperators.
189
A Michigan court denied participation to a group of tenants who
sought to be named necessary parties defendant to a foreclosure suit.
In Schaffer v. 8100 Jefferson Avenue East Corp. , 9o the cooperators, who
had proof of fraud by the cooperative corporation director, claimed
that they were joint venturers rather than cooperators, and as such were
equitable owners in common of the real estate. The court denied this
claim because the plaintiffs had "accepted the corporate form of owner-
ship"' 9 ' when their interest had been defined in the articles of the asso-
ciation. The court found that because the cooperative association
"owned" the property, the cooperator plaintiffs were mere lessees hold-
ing no more legal or equitable title than stockholders in other corpora-
tions.' 91 Thus, the cooperators were not necessary parties to the
foreclosure suit.
Neither the Astor nor the Schaffer court addressed the real nature
of the cooperative interest in reaching its decision. Results like these
186. 44 Misc. 2d 370, 253 N.Y.S.2d 937 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
187. Id. at 386, 253 N.Y.S.2d at 955. See also 2 P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, supra note 78, at
§ 2.01[5].
188. 325 Ill. App. 536, 60 N.E.2d 257 (1945).
189. Id. at 539, 60 N.E.2d at 258.
190. 267 Mich. 437, 255 N.W. 324 (1934).
191. Id. at 447, 255 N.W. at 327.
192. Id But see C.G.J. Corp. v. Hurwitz, 123 So. 2d 44 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
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will disappoint cooperators who believe they have purchased their
apartments. Unless cooperators are protected by state law,1 93 courts
following Astor or Schaffer will refuse to accept an "interest in prop-
erty" argument. Thus the cooperators will have no recourse against a
project sponsor who defaults before the requisite number of shares of
stock is sold.
4. The Cooperative Interest Under Blue Sky Laws
When a new cooperative venture is planned, a project sponsor
generally issues a prospectus, advertising bulletins, and copies of agree-
ments to attract purchasers. When asked to apply Blue Sky laws to
cooperatives, however, courts have almost uniformly decided that co-
operative apartment stock represents a transaction in real estate rather
than an investment for profit in a security. As a result, unless state Blue
Sky laws specifically include the sale of shares in cooperatively owned
real estate, cooperative purchasers have virtually no protection from
fraudulent plans and unscrupulous organizers.'
94
In deciding whether cooperative apartment stock is a security for
purposes of Blue Sky laws, the courts have required cooperators to sat-
isfy the three-pronged test traditionally associated with Blue Sky relief.
An investor who demands the protection of Blue Sky laws must invest
as part of a common scheme or plan; rely on others to manage the
investment; and have profit as the primary motive.' 95 Although coop-
erators meet the first requirement, they fail to meet the second because
they have a voice in the management of their apartments. In addition,
because they invest to obtain a place to live, they do not meet the third
requirement. An Ohio court reasoned that those who purchase cooper-
ative stock do so to acquire a percentage interest in an apartment build-
ing and the right to occupy a particular apartment as their home. Thus,
if corporate stock is involved in such a transaction, its sole purpose is to
work out the cooperative features of joint ownership, and not necessar-
ily to serve an investment function. 96 In effect, the courts have found
that the subject of the sale is real estate. The corporation exists only to
193. Under Florida law, for example, a foreclosure will not terminate a lease junior to the
mortgage if the lease is recorded or the tenant is in possession unless the tenant is made a party
defendant. Anderson, supra note 115, at 36.
194. See Miller, CooperativeApartments." Real Estate or Securies, 45 B.U. L. REV. 465, 484-
86 (1965).
Some of the decisions surveyed by Miller involve tortured definitions of "securities" and
"profits" and seem only to invite more confusion regarding the cooperator's interest. It is emi-
nently more practical for states to pass disclosure and registration rules such as those in New York
and to provide specific protection for cooperators. See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-e (McKinney
1968 & Supp. 1978).
195. Miller, supra note 194, at 467.
196. State v. Hersch, 101 Ohio App. 425, 429, 131 N.E.2d 419, 422 (1956). See also Willmont
v. Tellone, 137 So. 2d 610, 612 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Brothers v. McMahon, 351 Ill. App. 321,
115 N.E.2d 116 (1953); State v. Silberberg, 72 Ohio L. Abs. 481, 130 N.E.2d 244 (Ct. App. 1955),
aff'd, 166 Ohio St. 101, 139 N.E.2d 342 (1956).
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make the real estate ownership convenient, and the purpose of any
stock purchase is home ownership rather than profit.' 97
In 1975, the United States Supreme Court decided United Housing
Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 98 and held that low-to-middle income
subsidized cooperative housing did not qualify as an investment pro-
tected by federal securities laws.199 The Court asserted that "[c]ommon
sense suggests that people who intend to acquire only a residential
apartment in a state-subsidized cooperative, for their personal use, are
not likely to believe that in reality they are purchasing investment se-
curities simply because the transaction is evidenced by something
called a share of stock." 2" The Court chose to look at the economic
reality, not the form201 of a cooperative housing transaction. In
Forman, the Court decided only that the transaction involved was not
for investment purposes; the decision does not determine the nature of
the interest owned by cooperators.
V. COOPERATIVE HOMESTEADS IN SELECTED STATES
Statistical material collected in a 1975 study of condominium and
cooperative housing units by the Department of Housing and Urban
Development 20 2 provides a demographic profile of cooperative apart-
ment ownership in the United States. This study reveals that virtually
all cooperative units are the cooperator's primary hoffies, 203 and that
family income distribution of cooperative and condominium apartment
owners in 1970 was almost identical to that of owners of conventional
housing units.2' The study also reported that cooperative as well as
condominium owners tend to be either young couples or older couples
whose children have left home.2 5 These factors provide additional
reasons why the states should protect cooperative apartment owners
through homestead exemptions commensurate with those afforded the
owners of traditional, single-family homes.
Most of the available statistical data does not distinguish between
condominium and cooperative apartments. Nevertheless, it seems clear
that cooperative apartments are concentrated only in certain regions in
197. Miller, supra note 194, at 468.
198. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
199. Numerous articles have appeared since Forman was decided. See, for example, Recent
Cases, 26 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 735 (1976); Comment, Cooperative Housing Shares: A Security or
Substantively Secure?, 12 URB. L. ANN. 277 (1976). Project, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89
HARV. L. REV. 47, 254 (1975).
200. 421 U.S. at 851.
201. Id. at 848.
202. I - III U.S. DEPT. OF HOUSING & URBAN DEVELOPMENT CONDOMINIUM COOPERATIVE
STUDY (1975) [hereinafter cited as HUD STUDY].
203. I HUD STUDY, supra note 202, at 111-30.
204. Id. at 111-3 1.
205. Id. at 111-33.
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the United States, 2°6 and that they ate found primarily in urban envi-
ronments.2 °7 For these reasons this article limits the analysis of the
cooperator's interest under homestead exemption legislation to the ten
states which account for more than 80 percent of the cooperative hous-
ing in the United States: Florida, California, New York, Illinois, Mich-
igan, Pennsylvania, Texas, New Jersey, Arizona, and Ohio.2 °8 Recent
data confirm that nearly two-thirds of all the new construction of coop-
erative apartment units between 1970 and 1974 occurred in nine of
these ten states.2°9
A. Pennsylvania
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania does not provide by statute
for a homestead exemption either during the lifetime of the debtor or
for the benefit of the debtor's surviving spouse, minor children, or both.
Since 1849, however, that state has exempted a portion of the debtor's
property from levy and execution sale pursuant to any judgment on a





% of U.S. Condominiums
% of U.S. Cooperatives
% of All Owner-Occupied
Units (estimated)
North North
East Central South West United States
141 165 586 360 1,252
221 80 70 68 439
362 245 656 428 1,691
North North
East Central South West United States
11% 13% 47% 29% 100%
50% 18% 16% 16% 100%
20% 30% 32% 18% 100%
Id.
207. It is estimated that 30-35% of cooperatives in the United States are located in New York
City with other relatively high concentrations of cooperative and condonimum units in Chicago,
Detroit, and Philadelphia. Id. at 111-23.
208.
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Id. at 111-17.
209. Top Ten States Ranked by Recent Construction Activity
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contract. 2 '0 This legislation ensured the debtor of the primary necessi-
ties of life and a nucleus with which to begin life anew.21' The method
chosen by the Pennsylvania legislature to achieve these objectives does
not pose the same qualification problems for cooperative debtors as do
more typical homestead laws.
The Pennsylvania debtor's exemption is available to any debtor
who faces levy and sale pursuant to an adverse judgment on a contract.
Unlike conventional homestead statutes,21 2 the Pennsylvania statute
does not restrict the exemption to specific types of property. A qualify-
ing debtor may exempt a residence, cash, or other property. Thus, the
cooperator couldinvoke the exemption to protect his or her leasehold
and stock interest in a cooperative apartment. Because the statute is
not restrictive, the Pennsylvania courts need not characterize the coop-
erator's interest as realty, personalty, or a hybrid property interest.
Under the statute, the debtor need only notify the sheriff of the claimed
exemption before sale, and, if the exemption is claimed in property,
designate the property he or she elects to retain as exempt.21 3 The ma-
jor impediment to effectuating the legislative objectives behind the
Pennsylvania exemption is that the small amount-$300--of protection
it affords an debtor, whether a cooperator or not is of little practical
significance. 214













Id. Maryland will not be discussed because it does not have a homestead exemption law.
210. 12 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2161 (Purdon 1967).
Until 1951, this exemption from levy and sale on execution also covered those judgments
obtained upon distress for rent. Insofar as this section was applicable to distress for rent, it was
repealed by the Landlord and Tenant Act of April 6, 1951, Pub. L. No. 69, § 601 (68 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 250.601 (Purdon 1967)).
211. Mayhugh v. Coon, 460 Pa. 128, 134, 331 A.2d 452, 455 (1975).
212. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 52, § 1 (1977).
213. Maschke ex rel. Ehnes v. O'Brien, 142 Pa. Super. Ct. 559, 17 A.2d 923 (1941).
214. 12 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2161 (Purdon 1967). The legislature's failure to increase the
value limit for debtor exemptions and homestead exemptions in response to changing economic
conditions has seriously decreased the ability of these exemptions to fulfill the common purpose of
protecting the individual debtor and his or her family from complete impoverishment. While a
value limit is clearly desirable, it should not remain fixed in disregard of economic and other
social changes. Haskins, supra note 17, at 1293.
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more generous. Upon death, real or personal property, or both, to the
extent of $2,000 may be retained or claimed as exempt by the spouse of
any decedent domiciled in Pennsylvania or, under certain circum-
stances, by children or parents of the decedent-debtor who were mem-
bers of his household.21 5 This exemption takes priority not only over
general creditors but also over creditors who held judgment liens on the
decedent's real estate during his or her lifetime.2"6 Furthermore, the
exemption may be claimed even though the estate is insolvent. 2 7 Only
purchase money mortgages have priority over this statutory exemp-
tion.21 8 Because realty or personalty can be claimed under this exemp-
tion, the exemption will protect the surviving spouse's or children's
interest in the decedent's cooperative apartment. This exemption can
be claimed to the extent of the statutory amount without encountering
the difficulties attendant to the characterization of the cooperator's in-
terest for homestead protection.
21 9
B. New Jersey
New Jersey has no specific intervivos or probate homestead ex-
emption. Other legislation, however, protects the debtor and his or her
family from complete impoverishment at the hands of creditors, and
may protect a cooperator-debtor's interest in a cooperative apartment.
New Jersey also provides for special tax treatment of homestead prop-
erty, and in specific instances makes such treatment available to the
owners of cooperative apartments.
Any New Jersey debtor whose family resides in the state may ex-
empt from judicial seizure a portion of his or her personal property,22 °
including goods and chattels, shares of stock or interest in a corpora-
tion, and other personal property to the extent of $1,000.221 The ex-
emption protects the debtor during his or her lifetime and continues for
the benefit of his or her family after his or her death.222 After the death
of any person leaving a family residing in the state his or her family
may claim a statutory exemption of all wearing apparel of the decedent
and personal property to the extent of $500.223 This exemption oper-
ates against all creditors and before any distribution or other disposi-
215. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121 (Purdon 1975).
Throughout the remainder of this article, homestead protection invoked during the life of the
debtor-claimant shall be referred to as "intervivos homestead" provisions, and homestead protec-
tion available upon the death of a debtor shall be referred to as "probate homestead" provisions.
216. Koss' Estate, 59 Pa. D. & C. 308 (1947).
217. Newcomer's Estate, 9 Pa. D. & C.2d 99, 109 (1956).
218. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3126(a) (Purdon 1975).
219. If the decedent's interest in the cooperative apartment is specifically devised or be-
queathed by him, and if other assets are available for satisfaction of the exemption, the interest
may not be claimed under this provision. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121 (Purdon 1975).
220. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:17-19 (West Supp. 1978).
221. Id. In addition, all wearing apparel is exempted.
222. Id.
223. Id. § 3A:8-6 (West 1953).
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tion of the decedent's personal property.2 24 By accepting the provisions
of the decedent's will, however, a surviving spouse loses the statutory
exemption.225
These New Jersey statutes embody a legislative policy that neither
a living debtor nor the family of a deceased debtor should be wholly
impoverished by the forced payment of debts.226 Unlike homestead
provisions, however, the New Jersey exemptions apply only to person-
alty. This limitation indicates that the legislature did not intend to pro-
tect the residence of the debtor and his or her family from creditor's
claims. This assertion is supported by New Jersey laws that subject all
real estate of living debtors to levy and sale by execution.227
At common law, real estate could not be sold for the payment of
debts, 228 and even creditors with large claims against a landowner had
no power to collect the debt. In 1743 the New Jersey legislature de-
cided "to remedy this mischief' by making real estate chargeable with
debts and liable to be sold for their satisfaction.229 Unlike other juris-
dictions, however, New Jersey failed to balance the creditor's right to
secure satisfaction of debts with the need of shelter for debtors and
their families. Thus, New Jersey did not temper its creditors' rights
legislation by providing a homestead exemption to satisfy the legiti-
mate shelter needs of the debtor and his or her family.
The owner of a New Jersey cooperative apartment may be able to
claim the state personalty exemptions to protect his or her interest in
the cooperative apartment by characterizing that interest as personalty.
The personalty exemptions apply specifically to shares of stock in any
corporation, 230 thus protecting one of the two components of the coop-
erator's interest. The other component, the leasehold, if given its tech-
nically correct common law definition, would also be classified as
personalty. Thus, both interests would be within the protection of the
exemption statutes.
Allowing legal consequences to flow from such a mechanical char-
acterization of the cooperator's interest is generally unsatisfactory, even
though in New Jersey this characterization ironically may establish
protection for the debtor-cooperator where none was intended. Be-
cause of the hybrid character of the cooperator's interest, a less
mechanical analysis is better suited to this legal phenomena of coopera-
tive apartments. Such an analysis would examine the characteristics of
the cooperator's interest relevant to the particular purpose of the legis-
224. Id. This statutory exemption does not apply against reasonable funeral expenses of the
deceased. In re Cunningham's Estate, 17 N.J. Misc. 33, 3 A.2d 876 (Union County Orphans' Ct.
1939).
225. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:8-6 (West 1953).
226. Carey v. Monroe, 54 N.J. Eq. 632, 633-34, 35 A. 456, 457 (1896).
227. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:17-17 (West 1952).
228. See text accompanying note 35, supra.
229. Voorhees v. Chaffers, 24 N.J.L. 507, 509 (1854).
230. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:17-19 (West Supp. 1978).
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lation at issue. In light of the identified legislative purpose, the cooper-
ator's interest may then be classified as within or without the particular
statutory scheme.2 3'
Under this analysis, an interest in a cooperative apartment should
not be protected from creditors in New Jersey. The avowed intent of
the New Jersey statutes is to make the debtor's real property subject to
levy and execution to satisfy creditor's claims. Thus, a debtor who
owns his or her residence in fee enjoys no exemption. Because the
rights of the cooperator are in effect similar to those of the fee owner
the cooperator should be treated in the same manner. The-cooperator
should not be protected from creditors' claims through a facile charac-
terization of his or her interest as personalty.
While New Jersey does not provide for intervivos or probate
homestead protection, the New Jersey constitution was recently
amended to give to the state legislature the authority to "adopt a home-
stead statute which entitles homeowners, residential tenants, and net
lease residential tenants to a rebate or a credit of a sum of money re-
lated to property taxes paid by or allocable to them at such rates and
subject to such limits as may be provided by law. 2 32 Pursuant to this
provision, the New Jersey legislature has allowed a property tax deduc-
tion to individuals 65 or older, or less than 65 but permanently and
totally disabled, whose income is not over $5,000 and who reside in
their own "dwelling house. 2 3 3 This deduction is also available to a
surviving spouse 55 or older who remains in the dwelling house of the
deceased spouse for as long as the survivor remains unmarried.2 34 The
New Jersey legislature has also provided for a rebate to citizens who
pay property taxes on their dwelling houses, as well as their interests in
mutual housing corporations and cooperative housing corporations.235
This homestead credit may be deducted from an individual's state in-
come tax if the individual is either a "qualified residential tenant or
shareholder in a cooperative.
236
The property tax deduction for individuals who are 65 or older
may not apply to all cooperators over 65 because the statute requires
the claimant to own and reside in a "dwelling house." The analysis
advanced in this article suggests that this result is inequitable. In con-
trast, the rebate for property taxes and homestead credit against state
income tax is available specifically to cooperators.
231. See text accompanying note 4 and notes 155-56, supra.
232. N.J. CONST. art. 8, § 1, 5.
233. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 54:4-8.40 to 4-8.54 (West Supp. 1978).
234. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-8.41a (West Supp. 1978). See also N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 54:4-8.10
to 4-8.23 (West Supp. 1978), which grants a war veteran or a veteran's widow a $50 deduction
from real or personal property taxes, or both.
235. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 54:4-3.80 to 3.84; 54:4-6.2 to 6.13 (West Supp. 1978).




The cooperator should find it easier to qualify for Arizona's home-
stead provisions than for the exemptions in some of the other jurisdic-
tions surveyed. Arizona's homestead scheme is generous in terms of
dollar value, class of beneficiaries protected, and interests sufficient to
support a claim. Any state resident over 18 may hold a homestead ex-
empt from attachment, execution, and forced sale. The protected prop-
erty may be either real property, including a dwelling house, where the
claimant resides or other land designated by the claimant. The Arizona
provision may be used to exempt property up to $15,000 in value.2 37
The Arizona state courts have been liberal in determining the
quantum of title or right required to support a claim of homestead. In
an early case, In re Irving,2 38 the court specifically embraced the con-
cept that the smaller the estate and interest of the debtor, the more
important it is to preserve that interest for the debtor and his or her
family through the protection of the statute.239 Irving involved a lease
that granted the lessee the privilege of removing all improvements built
on the leased premises including a building in which he conducted a
mercantile business and resided with his family. The court found that
the lessee was entitled to claim as a homestead both the leasehold inter-
est in the land and the building.24 ° Recognizing the state's interest in
protecting families against pauperism and securing to them the means
of reasonable comfort,24' the court concluded that the Arizona legisla-
ture did not intend to deprive a person of the benefits of the homestead
laws merely because he or she did not own the fee in the land upon
which he or she resided.242
The Arizona courts have actually gone beyond recognition of a
lessee's right to come within the homestead law's protections. In an-
other case where the debtor was in possession of the land but was not
the record title owner, the Supreme Court of Arizona found mere pos-
session a sufficient predicate for her declaration of homestead.24  In
1974, a United States district court seated in Arizona reaffirmed the
concept that a possessory right is of sufficient value to the debtor to be
protected under the homestead law.2 " Consequently, the Arizona
courts would probably accept an argument that the cooperator's posses-
sory interest falls within the intervivos homestead provisions.
237. ARIz. REV. STAT. § 33-1101(A) (1974).
238. 220 F. 969 (D. Ariz. 1915). Irving was litigated under a prior Arizona statute which
provided for a homestead exemption in terms similar to the present statutory scheme for in-
tervivos homesteads. CIv. CODE ARIZ. § 3288 (1913).
239. 220 F. at 972.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 973.
242. Id. at 972.
243. Ferguson v. Roberts, 64 Ariz. 357, 361, 170 P.2d 855, 858 (1946).
244. First Nat'l Bank v. Boyd, 378 F. Supp. 961, 963-64 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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Arizona provides for an allowance to survivors of a decedent
rather than a probate homestead. The surviving spouse or dependent
children of the decedent are entitled to an allowance of $6,000. This
allowance is specifically in lieu of any homestead exemption the dece-
dent may have had during his or her lifetime.245 It is exempt from, and
has priority over, all claims against the decedent's estate except the ex-
penses of administration. The allowance is in addition to any share
passing to the surviving spouse or child by intestate succession, but is
chargeable against any share passing by the will of the decedent unless
the will provides otherwise.246 Because the survivor would receive cash
in lieu of a homestead, analysis of the availability of a probate home-
stead in a cooperative apartment is unnecessary.247
D. Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, and Texas
L Illinois
Under Illinois law, homestead property constitutes an estate in
land and is not a mere exemption.248 Whether this characterization of
the homestead interest is proper, the classification has "induced the [Il-
linois] courts to look more favorably upon the householder's interest
and has made its destruction more difficult. ' 249 Illinois statutes provide
for intervivos and probate protection from forced sale and execution.
250
In Illinois all householders having a family are entitled to a home-
stead estate, to the extent of $10,000, in either a farm or a lot with
buildings occupied as a residence by the householder.25' It may be
owned outright by the householder or "rightly possessed by lease or
otherwise." This homestead property is "exempt from attachment,
judgment, levy or execution sale for the payment of his debts or other
purposes and from the laws of conveyance, descent and devise. 252
Certain debts are expressly excepted, however, and do not receive this
245. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 14-2401 (Supp. 1978).
246. Id. This statutory provision is similar to the provisions of UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-
401, but the UPC provides that the homestead allowance is in addition to any share passing to the
surviving spouse or minor or dependent child by will of the decedent unless otherwise provided,
by intestate succession, or by way of the elective share.
247. A subsidiary question remains from Arizona's prior homestead law. The old law pre-
sumed the existence of a residential homestead in the decedent's estate. That is, if there was no
realty, there would not be a homestead to set apart. O'Connell and Effland, Intestate Succession
and Wills. A Comparative Analysis ofthe Law of Arizona and the Uniform Probate Code, 14 ARIZ.
L. REV. 205, 237 (1972). Under the present statutory scheme, at least one commentator has stated
that the homestead allowance is applicable to estates that do not include real estate as well as
those that do. Kruse, Highlights of Proposed Arizona Probate Code Revision, 8 ARIZ. B.J. 5, 7
(1972).
248. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 52, § 1 (1977). See also Weigand v. Weigand, 410 Ill. 533, 103
N.E.2d 137 (1952); Rice v. United Mercantile Agencies, 395 IlL. 512, 70 N.E.2d 618 (1947); Gar-
wood v. Garwood, 244 Ill. 580, 91 N.E. 672 (1910).
249. Note, The Illinois Homestead Exemption, 1950 U. ILL. L.F. 99, 101.
250. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 52, §§ 1, 2 (1977).




protection. The legislature has provided that the homestead may be
sold to satisfy unpaid taxes, assessments for debts incurred either in
purchasing or improving the property, and for condominium common
expenses.253
If a claim is made against the homestead property, an attempt
must first be made to set the homestead off from the rest of the premises
and to sell the remaining part to satisfy the claim.254 If the premises are
not divisible .and their value exceeds the claim, the homestead may be
sold with $10,000 of the sales price reserved for the homestead claim-
ant.255 Illinois further protects homestead residents by limiting the
ability of an individual to release or waive the homestead exemption or
to convey the homestead property.256 If conveyance occurs, however,
the homestead protection continues, for one year after receipt of the
proceeds, in $10,000 of the homestead sales price.257 The Illinois stat-
utes also protect up to $10,000 of insurance money paid for the loss of a
building which was exempted as a homestead.258
The homestead protection continues after the death of the house-
holder for the benefit of the surviving spouse or children as long as they
continue to occupy the homestead.259 This intervivos protection also
continues in the event that one of the spouses deserts the family. 260 The
Illinois probate- statutes specify how the homestead property is to be set
apart from the estate and protected by the estate's administrator, execu-
tor, or representative.26 1 If, however, a decedent devises homestead
property to his surviving spouse, and the surviving spouse accepts the
devise, this acceptance operates as an election by the surviving spouse
to take under the will in lieu of the homestead estate.262
The Illinois constitution provides that the Illinois General Assem-
bly may provide tax exemptions for homestead property, 263 but thus far
the Assembly has acted only to a limited extent. Real property that is
253. Id. § 3.
Illinois provides special protection to homestead owners who have defaulted in their mort-
gage payments. In such an instance
the court may permit the owner to remain in such occupancy [of the homestead] notwith-
standing the entry of an order placing a mortgagee in possession; provided, however, that
such owner shall pay to such mortgagee while such mortgagee is in possession after foreclo-
sure sale and deficiency the fair rental value of such portion of the premise so occupied.
Id. ch. 95, § 22b.60.
254. Id. ch. 52, §§ 4, 8-12; id. ch. 106, §§ 51, 55, 63.
255. Id. ch. 52,§§8, 11, 12.
256. Id. § 4.
257. Id. § 6.
258. Id. § 7.
259. Id. § 2.
260. Id.
261. Id. ch. 110 1/2, §§ 20-1 to 20-23.
262. See Remillard v. Remillard, 6 Ill. 2d 567, 129 N.E.2d 744 (1955); Stubblefield v. How-
ard, 348 Ill. 20, 180 N.E. 410 (1932); Koelling v. Foster, 254 I11. 494, 98 N.E. 952 (1912); Note,
supra note 249, at 119-20.
263. ILL. CONST. art. 9, § 6.
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owned and used exclusively as a home by a disabled veteran, his or her
spouse, or his or her unmarried surviving spouse is exempt from taxa-
tion up to an assessed value of $15,000.264 Illinois statutes also provide
for a $1,500 reduction in assessed value of the homestead of certain
persons over 65.265 This provision is expressly applicable to coopera-
tive apartments occupied by eligible persons. 266  Finally, persons who
improve property owned and used exclusively for a residential purpose
can take an annual $25,000 exclusion in actual value for up to 4 years
from when the improvement is completed and occupied.267
2. Michigan
Homestead protection against forced sale or execution is a consti-
tutional right in Michigan.268 Michigan law provides numerous bene-
fits to homestead property in the form of intervivos and probate
exemptions from forced sale or execution, special tax credits, and defer-
ments of special assessments. The Michigan statute that sets forth the
extent of homestead protection 269 does not require a claimant to own a
fee simple in order to claim homestead protection,270 and the courts
have extended this protection to a homestead held under a life estate
27'
and by a leasehold. 272 The Michigan legislature has expressly extended
this protection to condominium apartments.273 Furthermore, home-
264. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 500.23 (1977).
265. Id. § 500.23-1.
266. Id. The statute also benefits persons over 65 who are liable for real estate taxes and who
are "owner[s] of record of a legal or equitable interest in [a] cooperative apartment building, other
than a leasehold interest." Id.
267. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §§ 500.23-2 & -3 (1977), as amended by Act of Aug. 1, 1978,
Pub. Act 80-1288, 1978 Ill. Legis. Serv. 597 (West).
268. MICH. CONST. art. 10, § 3 provides:
A homestead in the amount of not less than $3500 and personal property of every resi-
dent of this state in the amount of not less than $750, as defined by law, shall be exempt from
forced sale on execution or other process of any court. Such exemptions shall not extend to
any lien thereon excluded from exemption by law.
269. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.6023(8) (1963). The statute provides in part:
(8) A homestead of not exceeding 40 acres of land and the dwelling house and appurte-
nances thereon, and not included in any recorded town plat, city or village, or, instead, and at
the option of the owner, a quantity of land not exceeding in amount I lot, being within a
recorded town plat, city or village, and the dwelling house and appurtenances thereon, owned
and occupied by any resident of this state, not exceeding in value $3,500.00. This exemption
extends to any person owning and occupying any house on land not his own and which such
person claims as a homestead. But this exemption does not apply to any mortgage on the
homestead, lawfully obtained, except that such mortgage is not valid without the signature of
a married judgment debtor's wife unless:
(a) The mortgage is given to secure the payment of the purchase money or a
portion thereof; or
(b) The mortgage is recorded in the office of the register of deeds of the county
wherein the property is located, for a period of 25 years, and no notice of a claim of invalidity
is filed in such office during the 25 years following the recording of the mortgage.
270. See Barnes v. Detroit, 379 Mich. 169, 177, 150 N.W.2d 740, 743 (1967).
271. Schumann v. Davis, 215 Mich. 19,183 N.W. 740 (1921); Myers v. Myers, 186 Mich. 215,
152 N.W. 934 (1915).
272. Maatta v. Kippola, 102 Mich. 116, 60 N.W. 300 (1894).
273. MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 559.19 (1967).
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steads held as tenancies in common,2 74 in joint tenancy,275 or as tenan-
cies by the entirety276 are also entitled to protection.
Michigan law provides a probate homestead protection for the sur-
vivors of a homestead owner. If the decedent leaves a family, home-
stead property is protected from forced sale or execution during the
minority of his or her children.277 If the decedent leaves no children,
his widow may claim the homestead exemption during her widowhood
unless she owns a homestead in her own right.278 A widow may elect to
take these homestead rights in lieu of testate or intestate statutory
shares.279
Michigan also provides tax advantages for certain owners of
homestead property.28 ° A Michigan taxpayer is allowed a credit
against state income tax for property taxes on a homestead that would
be deductible for federal income tax purposes.28' For purposes of this
tax credit, "homestead" is defined broadly to include a dwelling, a unit
in a multiple unit dwelling, certain farm property, mobile homes, and
trailer coaches in a trailer coach park.282 The property may be owned
outright, rented, or leased.
28 3
Michigan law also defers special assessments on a homestead
under certain conditions. 284 To qualify, one must be over 65, a U.S.
citizen and Michigan resident, and sole owner of the homestead for 5
years or more. The claimant must not have received an annual house-
hold income in excess of $6,000 and the assessment made against the
homestead must be greater than $300 exclusive of any interest paya-
ble.285 Qualification for the deferment delays the due date of the spe-
274. See Barnes v. Detroit, 379 Mich. 169, 150 N.w.2d 740 (1967); Fitzsimons v. Kane, 245
Mich. 246, 222 N.W. 111 (1928); Lawrence v. Morse, 122 Mich. 269, 80 N.W. 1087 (1899); King v.
Welborn, 83 Mich. 195, 47 N.W. 106 (1890); Sherrid v. Southwick, 43 Mich. 515, 5 N.W. 1027
(1880).
275. See Tharp v. Allen, 46 Mich. 389, 9 N.W. 443 (1881).
276. See Dunn v. Minnema, 323 Mich. 687, 36 N.W.2d 182 (1949); McCaslin v. Schouten, 294
Mich. 180, 292 N.W. 696 (1940); Jendon v. Diltz, 240 Mich. 512, 215 N.W. 313 (1927); Sanford v.
Bertrau, 204 Mich. 244, 169 N.W. 880 (1918); Zeigen v. Roiser, 200 Mich. 328, 166 N.W. 886
(1918); Cole v. Cole, 126 Mich. 569, 85 N.W. 1098 (1901).
277. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.6023(10) (1968).
278. Id. § 600.6023(10)(c).
279. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 702.69-.70 (1968).
280. See MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 206.501-.532 (Supp. 1978).
281. MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 206.520(I) (Supp. 1978).
282. Id. § 206.508(2).
283. Id. §§ 206.508(2), .520.
284. Id. §§ 211.761-.770. The statute provides:
"Special assessment" means an assessment against real property calculated on a benefit
or ad valorem basis for curb and gutter, sidewalk, sewer, water, or street paving; a drain; or a
connection fee or similar charge for a sewer or water system. Special assessment does not
include charges for current service.
Furthermore, for purposes of the deferment, "homestead" is defined as "a dwelling or a unit
in a multiple-unit dwelling, owned and occupied as a home by the owner thereof, including all
contiguous unoccupied real property owned by the person. Homestead includes a dwelling and an
outbuilding used in connection with a dwelling, situated on the lands of another." Id. § 211.761.
285. Id. § 211.763.
COOPERATIVE APARTMENTS
cial assessment until one year after the homestead owner's death or
until the homestead is conveyed or sold in whole or in part to an-
other.28 6 In the interim, the state retains a lien against the homestead
property.28 7
3. Ohio
Ohio's statutory scheme provides for intervivos and probate home-
stead exemptions as w6U as allowances or exemptions in lieu of home-
stead. The Ohio courts have consistently articulated a judicial policy of
liberal construction with regard to exemption statutes to effectuate the
benevolent purposes of the statutes 28 8 -to secure to the debtor and his
dependents a home free from the claims of creditors.8 9
The Ohio intervivos homestead exemption is available to a hus-
band and wife living together or to a widow or a widower living with
an unmarried daughter or unmarried minor son.2 90 Qualified claim-
ants may hold exempt a family homestead not exceeding $1,000 in
value.2 19  This provision has been interpreted to entitle any judgment
debtor with a family to claim a homestead exemption. 92
The probate homestead apparently is available to either surviving
spouse. According to one Ohio statute, when the executor or adminis-
trator petitions to sell the lands of a decedent survived by a widow or
an unmarried minor child for the satisfaction of debts, there should be
set apart for the widow a homestead not exceeding $1,000 in value.
293
Another more recent statute provides that the court shall order the set-
off and assignment of homesteads for the benefit of a decedent's surviv-
ing spouse or minor children who are entitled to a homestead.294 This
latter statute controls when inconsistent with the earlier statute, and has
been held applicable to a widower.295
The Ohio homestead exemption for realty is supplemented by a
286. Id. § 211.762. This statute also provides that "[tlhe death of a spouse shall not terminate
the deferment of special assessments for a homestead owned by a husband and wife under tenancy
by the entireties as long as the surviving spouse does not remarry. Special assessments deferred
hereunder may be paid in full at any time."
287. Id. §§ 211.766-.770.
288. See generally 27 OHIO JUR. 2D Homesteads § 5 (1957).
289. Id. § 3.
290. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.73 (Page 1954).
The Ohio Supreme Court has construed this statute to mean that a widow may hold exempt
from execution a homestead out of her own property although she is not living with an unmarried
daughter or an unmarried minor son. Allen v. Russell, 39 Ohio St. 336, 338 (1883).
291. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2329.73 (Page 1954).
292. In re Zerkle's Estate, 68 Ohio App. 480, 42 N.E.2d 204 (1941).
Ohio law specifically authorizes homestead protection for lessees. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2329.74 (Page 1954). This protection does not act as an impediment to the rights of the landlord
with regard to the underlying.fee. The statute specifically provides that it does not prevent a sale
of the fee simple subject to the lease. Id.
293. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.75 (Page 1954). The statute refers specifically to a widow.
294. Id. § 2127.26 (Page 1976).
295. Barnhiser v. Barnhiser, 25 Ohio Op. 388, 390 (Prob. Ct. 1943).
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scheme of allowances and exemptions in lieu of homestead. An in-
tervivos homestead may be charged with certain liens.2 96 If homestead
property is sold to satisfy those liens, the balance of any proceeds, not
to exceed $500, is awarded to the head of the family or the wife in lieu
of homestead.2 97 In the case of a probate homestead,2 98 the residue of
the proceeds, not exceeding $500, is payable to the widow or to an un-
married minor child in lieu of homestead.2 99 Finally, the Ohio scheme
gives certain relatives of a decedent a further exemption that can be
applied to real or personal property to the extent of $500 in value, in
addition to the amount of chattel property otherwise exempted by
law.3o
4. Texas
In Texas, homestead exemptions, established constitutionally and
by statute,30 1 are available for both urban and rural homesteads for
business or private use.30 2 Homesteads enjoy intervivos protection
against forced sale for the payment of debts, except where such debts
are incurred for the purchase of the homestead or for part of the
purchase money, the taxes due on the property, or for work and mate-
rial used in constructing improvements on the property.30 3 When the
tract of land upon which a rural family homestead is located is larger
than the number of acres protected by homestead, either the head of
the family or a board of special commissioners may designate the por-
tion of the property to be protected. 3°  This intervivos homestead pro-
tection is supplemented by the exemption of certain kinds of personal
296. The homestead exemption does not extend to a judgment rendered on a mortgage exe-
cuted by a debtor and spouse, nor to a claim for manual work or labor for less than $100, nor to
impair the lien, by mortgage or otherwise, of the vendor for the purchase money of the premises in
question, nor a mechanic's lien or the lien of other persons, under a statute in Ohio, for materials
furnished or labor performed in the erection of the dwelling house thereon, nor for the payment of
taxes due thereon. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.72 (Page 1954).
297. Id. § 2329.80.
298. See note 296 supra, regarding the extent of this homestead.
299. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.76 (Page 1954).
300. Id. § 2329.81.
301. See TEX. CONST. art. 16, § 51; TEX. Civ. CODE ANN. tit. 57, § 3833 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
302. TEX. CIv. CODE ANN. tit. 57, § 3833 (Vernon Supp. 1978). The statute provides:
(a) If it [the property] is used for the purposes of a home, or as a place to exercise the
calling or business to provide for a family or a single, adult person, not a constituent of a
family, the homestead of a family or a single, adult person, not a constituent of a family, shall
consist of:
(I) for a family, not more than two hundred acres, which may be in one or more
parcels, with the improvements thereon, if not in a city, town, or village; or
(2) for a single, adult person, not a constituent of a family, not more than one
hundred acres, which may be in one or more parcels, with the improvements
thereon, if not in a city, town, or village; or
(3) for a family or a single, adult person, not a constitutent of a family, a lot or
lots, not to exceed in value ten thousand dollars at the time of their designation
as a homestead, without reference to the value of any improvements thereon, if
in a city, town, or village.
303. TEX. CONST. art. 16, § 50; TEX. CIv. CODE ANN. tit. 57, § 3839 (Vernon 1966).
304. TEX. CIv. CODE ANN. tit. 57, ,f 3841-3859 (Vernon 1966).
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property from attachment, execution, and seizure for the satisfaction of
debts except for encumbrances "properly fixed" upon the personalty.
30 5
Upon the death of an individual, his or her homestead property
will descend and vest like any other interest in realty,3" unless the sur-
viving spouse elects to use the homestead or the guardian of the de-
ceased's minor children receives permission by court order to use and
occupy this property.30 7 The homestead property may also be set apart
from the rest of the estate and delivered for the use of any of the
decedent's unmarried daughters.3"8 If the probate homestead is set
apart by election or court order, however, it is similar to the intervivos
probate protection.3" 9 If the homestead property is subject to a valid
lien or encumbrance, the debt will continue against the property until
satisfied." Texas law also provides that if the stated exemptions can-
not be used because the decedent did not own any of the specific prop-
erty exempted, the court may grant the widow and children a
reasonable allowance not to exceed $10,000 in lieu of the homestead,
and $1,000 in lieu of other kinds of exempt property.3"
Texas also provides certain tax benefits for homestead property.
The state constitution provides that $3,000 of the assessed valuation of
a residence homestead is exempt from taxation for all state purposes.3 12
In addition, when a Texas county levies ad valorem taxes for the con-
struction and maintenance of "farm to market roads" or for "flood con-
trol," the first $3,000 value of a residential homestead is exempt from
assessment, provided that the exempt amount does not exceed the stat-
utory ceiling.3 t3 Tax claims can be satisifed by sale of a homestead
only if the taxes involved were levied directly on the homestead prop-
erty.314 Any Texas county, city, town, school district, or other state po-
litical subdivision may exempt from their ad valorem taxation an
amount not less than $3,000 for residence homesteads held by individu-
als 65 or older.3 5 A person 65 or older may also defer payment of ad
valorem property taxes on his or her homestead until he or she no
longer owns or occupies the property as a homestead.31 6
305. TEX. CONST. art. 16, § 49; TEX. CIv. CODE ANN. tit. 56, § 3836 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
306. TEX. CONST. art. 16, § 52; TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 271-272, 278-279, 283 (Vernon
1956).
307. TEX. CONST. art. 16, § 52; TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 271-272, 284-285 (Vernon 1956).
308. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 271-272 (Vernon 1956).
309. Id. § 270. See also TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 281 (Vernon 1956) which makes the home-
stead property exempt from funeral expenses of the deceased and medical expenses for the de-
ceased's last illness.
310. Id. § 277.
311. Id. § 273 (Vernon Supp. 1978), §§ 274-276 (Vernon 1956).
312. TEx. CONST. art. 8, § l-b(a).
313. Id. §§ 1-2; TEx. TAX CODE ANN. tit. 122, § 7048a(2) (Vernon 1960).
314. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 7279 (Vernon 1960).
315. TEx. CONST. art. 8, § 1-b(b).
316. TEx. TAX CODE ANN. tit. 122, § 7329a (Vernon Supp. 1978).




Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, and Texas have not yet decided, legisla-
tively or judicially, whether homestead protections extend to stock-
owned cooperative apartments. Such an extension is feasible under the
present law of each of these states. The legislatures of Illinois, Michi-
gan, and Ohio have extended homestead protection to leasehold prop-
erty occupied and used as the claimant's home.3 17 In Texas, the courts
have applied homestead provisions to leasehold property.3"' There-
fore, the leasehold interest of the cooperator claimant should be pro-
tected in these four states. This established right of a lessee to qualify
for homestead protection, coupled with state policies of liberal con-
struction of the homestead provisions,319 should promote recognition of
homestead protection for the cooperator's stock interest as well.
Because the cooperator's interest in the cooperative apartment
consists of a long term lease and stock, protecting the leasehold interest
without also immunizing the stock from creditors' claims would be
meaningless. Only by virtue of a stock interest in the corporation is the
cooperator entitled to occupancy under the lease. To find that the co-
operator's interests were divisible would be both "confusing and unfor-
tunate":
It would be confusing because of the substantial question as to
what a purchaser at execution sale would get. He would have a
share of stock, the primary value of which lies in the holder's being
entitled to a non-profit lease on a designated apartment. But, be-
cause the judgment debtor's lease is exempt, this attribute of his
purchase is missing. It is unlikely that this stock would bring full
value at execution sale. Also, standard cooperative leases provide
that ownership of apartment leases cannot be separated from own-
ership of the related share of stock. If this provision be enforced,
the homestead claimant will be evicted by the project, and his en-
the state may not deny old-age assistance to a person who is 65 or older because he owns a
residence homestead.
317. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 52, § 1 (1977); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 600.6023(8) (1963); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. tit. 23, § 2329.74 (Page 1954). See also Rice v. United Mercantile Agencies, 395
Ill. 512, 70 N.E.2d 618 (1946); Stombaugh v. Morey, 388 Ill. 401, 58 N.E.2d 545 (1944).
318. See Beckner v. Barrett, 81 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935); Sterling Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co. v. Ellis, 75 S.W.2d 716 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934); Evans v. Galbraith-Foxworth Lumber
Co., 51 S.W.2d 831 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932); Cry v. J.W. Bass Hardware, 273 S.W. 347 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1925); Stephens v. Cox, 255 S.W. 241 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923); Ellis v. Bingham, 150 S.W. 602
(Tex. Civ. App. 1912).
319. See In re Neale, 274 F. Supp. 969, 973 (N.D. Tex. 1967); Scogin v. Scogin, 337 Il. 427,
169 N.E. 201 (1929); Zachman v. Zachman, 201 II. 380, 391, 66 N.E. 256, 260 (1903); Bartold v.
Lewandowska, 304 Mich. 450, 8 N.W.2d 133 (1943); Miller v. Detroit Say. Bank, 289 Mich. 494,
286 N.W. 803 (1939); Kleinert v. Lefkowitz, 271 Mich. 79, 259 N.W. 871 (1935); Riggs v. Sterling,
60 Mich. 643, 27 N.W. 705 (1886); Andrews v. Security Nat'l Bank, 121 Tex. 409, 50 S.W.2d 253
(1932); Orr v. Orr, 226 S.W.2d 172 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949); Uptmor v. Janes, 210 S.W.2d 235 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1948); Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Burgess, 155 S.W.2d 977 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941);
Panhandle Const. Co. v. Head, 134 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939); 27 OHIO JUR. 2D
Homesteads §§ 3, 5 (1957).
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tire constitutional protection disappears. A holding that coopera-
tive stock is not entitled to homestead protection would be
unfortunate because cooperative ownership would not be on par
with single dwelling ownership, in which both possessory rights
and homeowner's equity are protected from creditor's levy.
320
Recognition of homestead protection for cooperators' leasehold and
stock interests in these four states would constitute a continuation of
and adherence to the policies underlying such legislative protections
and would not be a major deviation from any public policy.
E. Florida
Florida's homestead law offers both intervivos and probate protec-
tion against the forced sale of homestead property, 321 as well as a
$5,000 tax exemption for qualified homestead property.322 These pro-
visions are intended to preserve "a home where the family may be shel-
tered and live beyond the reach of economic misfortune. ' 323 To
further this policy, the Florida courts have followed the practice of con-
struing these laws liberally.
324
Article 10 of the Florida constitution provides the basis for the
intervivos homestead protection. That provision states that a "head of
a family" may hold up to 160 acres of contiguous, nonmunicipal land,
or one-half acre of municipal land on which his or her residence is
located, as well as $1,000 worth of personalty, free from forced sale or a
lien resulting from a court judgment, decree, or resolution.325 A lien
may be applied against homestead property, however, if it arose due to
nonpayment of taxes or debts incurred for the purchase, improvement,
or repair of the property.326 To assure homestead protection, the head
of a family must claim and designate the homestead before a levy is
made against the property or prior to the day of sale of the property.327
This exemption may be applied to leasehold property under certain
conditions, 328 as well as to mobile and modular homes.
329
The probate homestead exemption is for the most part a continua-
320. Mixon, supra note 40, at 267-68.
321. FLA. CONST. art. 10, § 4; FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 222.01-.19 (West 1977 & Supp. 1978),
§§ 732.401-.403 (West 1976).
322. FLA. CONST. art. 7, § 6; FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 196.031, .041 (West 1971 & Supp. 1977).
323. 16 FLA. JUR. Homesteads § 4 (1957).
324. Id. § 5. See also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 222.19(1) (West 1977).
325. FLA. CONST. art. 10, § 4(a)(l)-(2).
326. Id.
327. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 222.01-.02 (West Supp. 1978).
328. Id. § 222.05 provides that
talny person owning and occupying any dwelling house, including a mobile home used
as a residence, or modular home, on land not his own which he may lawfully possess, by lease
or otherwise, and claiming such house, mobile home, or modular home as his homestead,
shall be entitled to the exemption of such house, mobile home, or modular home from levy
and sale as aforesaid.
329. Id. §§ 222.01, .02, .05.
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tion of the intervivos exemption for the benefit of the deceased's surviv-
ing spouse or heirs.330  The homestead may not be devised if the
decedent is survived by a spouse or minor child, with the exception that
it may be devised to the surviving spouse if there are no minor chil-
dren.33' If the homestead is not devised under Florida law, it descends
according to the state's intestacy laws, with the express statutory reser-
vation that a surviving spouse shall take a life estate in the property,
with a vested remainder to those lineal descendants alive at the time of
the decedent's death.332
Florida law also provides a $5,000 tax exemption for homestead
property.333 The claimant must fulfill three requirements to lualify for
this exemption. First, he or she must have either legal or beneficial title
in equity in real property334 held jointly, in common, or by the entirety.
The property may even be a condominium or stock-owned cooperative
apartment. 3 5 Third, he or she must make this property his or her per-
manent home or the home of persons who are legally or naturally de-
pendent upon him or her.336 This tax exemption does not apply to
assessments for special benefits, and may not exceed the value of the
real estate or, in the case of a stock cooperative, the value of the stock-
holder's interest in the corporation.337 One exemption per individual
or family dwelling house may be taken; in the case of a cooperative
apartment corporation or condominium development, one exemption
per apartment is permitted.338
Florida's application of homestead exemptions to stock-owned co-
operatives is somewhat confused. While a cooperator may claim the
330. See FLA. CONST. art. 10, § 4(b).
331. Id. § 4(c); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.4015 (West 1976).
332. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.401 (West 1976).
A family allowance provision supplements the probate homestead exemption. The allowance
provides that a deceased's surviving spouse and lineal heirs whom the decedent was obligated to
support or who were in fact supported by the decedent are entitled to a reasonable allowance in
money not in excess of $6,000 for maintenance during administration. The surviving spouse or
minor children are also entitled to automobiles, household furniture, furnishings, and appliances
in decedent's place of abode up to a net value of $5,000 as well as personal effects of the decedent
up to a net value of $ 1,000 unless the personal effects are otherwise specifically disposed of by will.
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 732.402-.403 (West 1976).
333. FLA. CONST. art. 7, § 6; FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 196.031, .041 (West 1971 & Supp. 1978).
334. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 196.031(1) (West 1971).
335. Id. This statute defines a "cooperative apartment corporation" as
a corporation, whether for profit or not for profit, organized for the purpose of owning, main-
taining and operating an apartment building or apartment buildings to be occupied by its
stockholders or members; and "tenant-stockholder or member" means an individual who is
entitled, solely by reason of his ownership of stock or membership in a cooperative apartment
corporation, to occupy for dwelling purposes an apartment in a building owned by such cor-
poration. A corporation leasing land for a term of ninety-eight years or more for the purpose
of maintaining and operating a cooperative apartment thereon shall be deemed the owner for
purposes of this exemption.
Id. § 196.031(2).





homestead tax exemption, his or her family is not protected by the pro-
bate homestead exemption. This result may be due to the difference in
language in the constitutional and statutory sections that provide for
these two exemptions. 339 For example, in the homestead tax exemption
provisions, the express use of the term "cooperative apartment corpora-
tion" has brought the stock cooperative within the meaning of "real
property" and "dwelling house" for purposes of the tax exemption. 34
In contrast, neither the Florida constitution nor state statutes have ex-
tended the intervivos or probate homestead exemptions to stock coop-
eratives, and the case law evidences a judicial refusal to imply such an
extension. In 1971, the Florida Attorney General ruled that an owner
of a stock cooperative had but a personalty interest in his or her stock
and was without the requisite "interest in land" to qualify for an in-
tervivos or probate homestead exemption under Florida law.341 The
Florida courts adopted this view in Estate of Wartels,342 and ultimately
held that the cooperative apartment dweller does not quality for home-
stead protection.34 3 Both Wartels and the Attorney General's Opinion
stated that this result did not conflict with the homestead tax exemption
because the tax benefit had been expressly extended to cooperatives
and did not affect other homestead provisions.
Wartels and the 1971 Attorney General's Opinion are contrary to
the Florida policy of construing homestead provisions liberally for the
protection of its residents.345 Moreover, in the attempt to limit these
exemptions to comport with historically characterized property inter-
ests, the Florida courts have in effect elevated the fulfillment of techni-
cal requirements above the protective purpose of the homestead
exemption. The Florida opinions inaccurately characterize a coopera-
tor's interest as a personalty interest in stock, while ignoring the coop-
erator's long-term leasehold interest in the cooperative apartment.346
The cooperator's stock interest entitles him or her to occupancy under
the lease. Thus the homestead protection that Florida accords to lease-
holds 347 should apply analogously to cooperative apartments.
Homestead protection could be extended to cooperative apart-
ments. While cooperatives enjoy no express statutory or constitutional
inclusion, neither are they expressly precluded. The only constitutional
339. Compare FLA. CONST. art. 10, § 4 [andj FLA. STAT. ANN. § 222.01-.19 (West 1977 &
Supp. 1978), §§ 732.401-.403 (West 1976) with FLA. CONST. art. 7, § 6 [and) FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 196.031, .041 (West 1971 & Supp. 1978).
340. Ammerman v. Markham, 222 So. 2d 423, 426 (Fla. 1969). See also [1961-1962] FLA.
AT-r'y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 89 (Op. No. 061-55).
341. [19711 FLA. Arr'y GEN. ANN. REP. 27 (Op. No. 071-19).
342. 338 So. 2d 48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976), afl'd, 357 So. 2d 708 (Fla. 1978).
343. 357 So. 2d at 711.
344. 357 So. 2d at 710, [1971] FLA. Arr'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 27 (Op. No. 071-19).
345. See text accompanying note 324 supra.
346. See text accompanying notes 89-91 supra.
347. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 222.05 (West Supp. 1978).
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requirement for an intervivos and probate homestead exemption is that
it apply to an appropriate number of acres of "contiguous land and
improvements thereon."" In Wartels, the Florida Supreme Court
cited three prior cases to support the proposition that this "contiguous
land" language requires homestead property to consist of "interest in
realty." '349 Those decisions, however, did not restrict exemption from
forced sale or execution to realty interests. Furthermore, in contrast
with the "contiguous land" restriction in the intervivos and probate ex-
emption provision, the Florida constitution restricts the homestead tax
exemption to situations in which the claimant possesses a legal title or
beneficial title in equity to realproperty.35° An express statutory exten-
sion of this exemption to a stock-owned cooperative was necessary be-
cause the cooperator's interest in the stock and lease are both
technically classified as personalty. Because the Florida constitutional
provision for homestead property exemptions does not contain such a
"real property" requirement, an express extension by the legislature
would not seem to be needed to extend this exemption to cooperative
apartments. Indeed, the Florida legislature may have intended to ex-
tend this homestead protection to stock-owned cooperatives when it
granted such protection to property held by leasehold. 5'
F New York
The New York homestead laws have recently been amended to
provide liberal intervivos and probate homestead protection.352 The
New York provisions currently exempt from forced sale homestead
property up to $10,000 in value "above liens and encumbrances. 353
Furthermore, any lot of land upon which a dwelling, a cooperative
apartment, or a condominium unit stands may constitute a homestead
as long as the claimed homestead is owned and occupied as a principal
residence.354 Should a person cease to occupy the property as a home-
stead, the exemption ceases unless "the suspension of occupation is for
a period not exceeding one year, and occurs in consequence of injury
348. FLA, CONST. art. 10, § 4(a)(l).
349. Estate of Wartels, 357 So. 2d 708, 710 (Fla. 1978). See Pasco v. Harley, 73 Fla. 819, 75
So. 30 (1917); Hill v. First Nat'l Bank, 73 Fla. 1092, 75 So. 614 (1917); Milton v. Milton, 63 Fla.
533, 58 So. 718 (1912).
350. FLA. CONST. art. 7, § 6(a).
351. See text accompanying notes 328, 346-47 supra.
An additional argument to extend intervivos and probate homestead protection to stock-
owned cooperatives can be made from the recent action of the Florida legislature giving such
homestead protection to mobile homes. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 222.01, .02, .05 (West Supp.
1978). A mobile home is personalty, and the previously mentioned statutes do not require that it
be attached to the land so as to be converted to an interest in realty. It is arguable that if Florida
has given homestead protection to such a personalty interest as a mobile home, then such protec-
tion should also be provided for a stock-owned cooperative apartment.
352. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 5206 (McKinney 1978).




to, or destruction of, the dwelling house upon the premises. 355
If the value of the homestead exceeds $10,000 a judgment may be
had against the surplus.356 When this is the case, the land may be sold,
but $10,000 of the proceeds is paid to the judgment debtor. The ex-
emption continues to apply to those proceeds for one year unless the
debtor acquires a new homestead. In that event, the exemption ceases
as to the proceeds not used to acquire the new homestead. The new
homestead, however, is protected as against "every debt against which
the property sold was exempt.
357
New York's probate homestead exemption is merely a continua-
tion of its intervivos protection. The protection passes to the home-
stead owner's surviving spouse and children and continues until the
youngest surviving child reaches majority and until the surviving
spouse dies.358 When probate homestead property is sold or when the
homestead owner had sold the property but died without having col-
lected payment, the court may direct that a portion of the proceeds be
invested for the benefit of the survivors, or be "otherwise disposed of as
justice requires.
359
The New York homestead statute explicitly exempts from forced
sale the "shares of stock in a cooperative apartment corporation.
'360
This obviously protects the cooperator's stock interest in the apartment,
and by implication protects the cooperator's leasehold interest because
only through possession of the protected stock is he or she entitled to
hold the lease. A court could not consistently protect the stock interest
of a cooperator and at the same time deny the cooperator a right to
which he or she is entitled through ownership of the stock.
G. California
California, too, extends the protection of its homestead provisions
to cooperators in a stock-owned cooperative. The California Code de-
fines "homestead" as a "dwelling house in which the claimant resides,
together with outbuildings, and the land on which the same are situ-
ated,"' 36' and expressly states that a "dwelling house may be in a...
stock cooperative. "362 Furthermore, the California homestead law pro-
355. Id. § 5206(c).
356. Id. § 5206(d).
357. Id. § 5206(e).
See N.Y. PRIv. Hous. FIN. LAW § 85-b (McKinney 1976) on how to establish the resale price
of a subsidized cooperative apartment.
358. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 5206(b) (McKinney 1978).
359. Id. § 5206(e).
360. Id. § 5206(a)(2).
361. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1237 (West Supp. 1978).
362. Id. The statute also states that a dwelling house may be a condominium, a planned
development, a community apartment project, or may be situated on real property held under a
lease of 30 years or more.
For purposes of the homestead exemption, the stock cooperative must fall within the statu-
tory definition found in CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 11003.2 (West Supp. 1978), which states:
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vides that a homestead may be selected from
any freehold, title interest or estate which vests in the claimant the
immediate right of possession, even though such possession is not
exclusive, and includes land held under a long term lease. . ., and
ownership rights in a condominium, planned development, stock
cooperative, or community apartment project even though the ti-
tle, interest, or estate of the condominium, planned development,
stock cooperative or community apartment project is in a lease-
hold or subleasehold.
363
California's intervivos homestead provisions protect against execu-
tion or forced sale of any property which fulfills the statutory require-
ments for a valid homestead.3 4 The head of a family or a person 65 or
older may select up to $30,000 of property at its actual cash value for
the homestead protection, while other persons are limited to $15,000
worth of protection.365 An unmarried individual may designate home-
stead property from the property he or she owns. A married couple
may select property for the homestead exemption from separate prop-
erty, from their community or quasi-community property, or from
property they hold as joint tenants or tenants in common.366 As a con-
dition precedent to qualification for such protection the claimant must
file a proper declaration of homestead with the county recorder in the
county where the land is situated.367
The intervivos homestead exemption does not protect homesteads
in certain situations. If residence is taken in a condominium, planned
development, community apartment project, or stock cooperative sub-
ject to an underlying agreement or obligation, that agreement or a lien
arising from it may be enforced as if no homestead were declared.368
The California Civil Code also prescribes situations in which a court
judgment may be satisfied by the execution or forced sale of a home-
stead. These situations occur when a judgment is obtained before the
declaration of homestead is recorded and when the judgment is on
debts secured by certain statutory liens or by encumbrances on the
homestead.3 69 A creditor must meet detailed statutory requirements
before proceeding against the homestead under these provisions. 7 °
A "stock cooperative" is a corporation which is formed or availed of primarily for the
purpose of holding title to, either in fee simple or for a term of years, improved real property,
if all or substantially all of the shareholders of such corporation receive a right of exclusive
occupancy in a portion of the real property, title to which is held by the corporation, which
right of occupancy is transferable only concurrently with the transfer of the share or shares of
stock in the corporation held by the person having such right of occupancy.
363. CAL. CiV. CODE § 1238 (West Supp. 1978) (emphasis added).
364. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1240 (West 1954).
365. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1260 (West Supp. 1978).
366. Id. § 1238.
367. See CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1241(l), (4), 1262-1264, 1266-1304 (West 1954 & Supp. 1978).
368. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1237 (West Supp. 1978).
369. Id. § 1241.
370. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1245-1259 (West 1954 & Supp. 1978).
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California provides a probate homestead exemption by statute. A
surviving spouse and minor children may continue to occupy the dece-
dent's homestead property until an inventory has been filed with the
probate court.37' Subsequently, the court will set aside any or all of the
decedent's property to be exempt from execution for the protection of
his surviving spouse or minor children.
37 2
This probate homestead exemption is created by one of two meth-
ods. The first is through the continuation of an intervivos homestead
exemption as previously declared and recorded by the decedent.37
3
The California statutes provide specifically how such homestead prop-
erty will descend and vest in either the surviving spouse or the heirs
and devisees of the decedent. 374 The intervivos protection of a lessee-
stockholder's interest in a stock-owned cooperative may also be ex-
tended so that an interest in a stock-owned cooperative receives the
protection of the probate homestead exemption.
If the probate homestead is valued at $10,000 or less, the allowable
amount for the intervivos homestead, the limits of protection are the
same.37 5 If the value is greater than $10,000, an inheritance tax referee
must appraise the property and determine whether the premises can be
divided without material injury. If divisible, the referee will set apart
to the protected parties a portion of the premises equal in value to the
intervivos limit. 376 If the referee should report that the property cannot
be divided, however, the court may order a sale of the entire prem-
ises377 and distribute the cash equivalent of the homestead exemption
to the surviving spouse or heirs and devisees of the decedent.
378
371. CAL. PROB. CODE § 660 (West Supp. 1978).
372. Id.
373. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1265 (West Supp. 1978); CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 660, 663 (West
Supp. 1978).
374. When a married couple has declared an intervivos homestead exemption, the exemption
descends and vests to the survivor
[i]f the homestead selected by the husband and wife, or either of them, during their coverture,
and recorded while both were living, other than a married person's separate homestead, was
selected from the community property or quasi-community property, or from the separate
property of the person selecting or joining in the selection of the same, and if the survivin
spouse as not conveyed the homestead to the other spouse by a recorded conveyance which
failed to expressly reserve his homestead rights as provided by Section 1242 of the [Califor-
nia] Civil Code.
CAL. PROB. CODE § 663 (West Supp. 1978); CAL. CIv. CODE § 1265 (West Supp. 1978). In all
other cases, the homestead is to descend and vest in the decedent's heirs and devisees subject to
the court's power to temporarily set aside the homestead for the decedent's family. Id.
375. CAL. PROB. CODE § 664 (West Supp. 1978).
376. Id.
377. Id. § 665.
378. See In re Durham's Estate, 108 Cal. App. 2d 148, 238 P.2d 1057 (1951):
However, some situations exist in which the homestead property will still not be subject to
forced sale or execution. CAL. PROB. CODE § 735 (West 1956) provides that
[ilf there are subsisting liens or encumbrances on the homestead, and the funds of the estate
are adequate to pay all claims against the estate, the claims secured by such liens or encum-
brances, whether filed or presented or not, if known or made known to the executor or ad-
ministrator, must be paid out of such funds. If the funds of the estate are not sufficient for
that purpose, the claims so secured shall be paid proportionately with other claims allowed,
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The probate homestead may also be created by the court, if the
decedent failed to declare and record an intervivos homestead, or if the
surviving spouse selected the homestead out of the decedent's separate
property without the decedent joining in its declaration or recording.
In this case, a probate court may select, designate, or set apart property
for a homestead exemption for the protection of the decedent's surviv-
ing spouse and minor children.379 The probate statutes do not desig-
nate the type of property a court may select in providing the homestead
exemption. The California courts have generally looked to the in-
tervivos homestead statutes to determine those types of property which
may be set aside for the probate homestead.38 ° Thus, a court may ap-
ply the probate homestead exemption to stock-owned cooperatives in
instances where the decedent failed to declare an intervivos homestead
for such property. Nor do the probate statutes specify the amount of
property that the court may select for probate homestead protection
when the decedent has failed to record a declaration of homestead.
Several California decisions indicate that the courts are not limited by
the amount set in the intervivos homestead exemptions. 38' For exam-
ple, in Estate of Nelson,382 a California appellate court upheld a lower
court's selection of an apartment house worth $224,000 as the home-
stead of a surviving spouse. Thus, it would seem that a California de-
cedent may provide more protection for his or her survivors by failing
to declare a homestead and allowing for its provision by the probate
court than if he or she were to declare and record an intervivos home-
stead to be continued as a probate homestead.
VI. MISCELLANEOUS PROBLEMS
The premise of this article has been that the cooperator's interest,
both the stock and long-term lease, in a stock-owned cooperative
should be afforded the same protection given single dwelling owner-
ship. Fairness, logic, and public policy demand that parity be achieved
by protecting cooperative apartment ownership to the same extent that
the state would protect a single family home from creditors. Such a
result is achievable but there are problems which would flow from
bringing the cooperative apartment within the protection of state
homestead legislation.
The nature of the cooperators' undivided joint ownership in the
assets of the cooperative corporation results in a certain degree of
and the liens or encumbrances on the homestead shall only be enforced against the home-
stead for any deficiency remaining after such payment.
379. CAL. PROB. CODE § 661 (West Supp. 1977).
380. Comment, The Probate Homestead in California, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 655, 658 (1965).
381. In re Adams' Estate, 128 Cal. 380, 57 P. 569 (1899); In re Estate of Smith, 99 Cal. 449, 34
P. 77 (1893); In re Walkerly's Estate, 81 Cal. 579, 22 P. 888 (1889); Estate of Nelson, 224 Cal. App.
2d 138, 36 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1964); In re Muntz's Estate, 69 Cal. App. 404, 231 P. 371 (1924).
382. 224 Cal. App. 2d 138, 36 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1964).
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financial interdependence among all the cooperators. 383 The corpora-
tion itself has the financial obligations of paying property taxes, making
mortgage payments, and financing the ordinary expenses of the project
such as upkeep of common areas and amenities. 384 To meet these
financial obligations, the corporation, through its board of directors,
annually fixes a sum of money denominated as "rent" or a project as-
sessment which the individual cooperators must pay.385 If a cooperator
fails to pay the assessment, the other cooperators must do so to protect
their own interests. If a sufficient number of cooperators default, how-
ever, the project may fail. The corporation would then have insuffi-
cient funds to meet its financial obligations, inducing mortgage
foreclosure or attachment by project creditors, 386 discontinuance of
utility service, and abandonment of upkeep in common areas.387
Unpaid project assessments present a very real danger to the
financial integrity of the corporation. One way the corporation at-
tempts to protect itself from this danger is by retaining power to evict
individual nonpaying cooperators.388 This power to evict should not be
disturbed in extending homestead protection to cooperators. The indi-
vidual cooperator's homestead exemption must be subordinate to this
power of the corporation. 389 The respective rights of the cooperator
and corporation would then be determined by analogy to those cases in
which the homestead exemption in a traditional leasehold interest is
claimed: the tenant may not assert a homestead interest against his or
her landlord in the premises he or she occupies by virtue of the lease.
390
Another problem flows from the cooperator's status as a stock-
holder in the cooperative corporation. In the usual homestead exemp-
tion situation, the claimant asserts a right to maintain his or her home
as exempt from certain classes of personal creditors. Due to the corpo-
rate structure of the cooperative project, however, potential creditors of
the corporation itself as well as personal creditors of the individual co-
operators may seek to enforce claims against the cooperative property.
The corporate form insulates cooperators from individual liability for
corporate debts, and creditors of the corporation may not by direct le-
383. P. KEHOE, COOPERATIVES AND CONDOMINIUMS 15 (1974); Mixon, supra note 40, at 269.
384. P. KEHOE, supra note 383, at 15.
385. See text accompanying note 98 supra.
386. P. KEHOE, supra note 383, at 15-16.
The creditors of the corporation cannot seek direct payment of the corporation's debts from
the individual cooperators. If the corporation is forced into bankruptcy and liquidated, however,
the individual cooperator would probably lose all or a part of the money invested in the corpora-
tion's stock. Also the cooperators' proprietary leases may be cancelled as part of the liquidation
process, causing the cooperators to lose their right to occupy their apartments.
387. Mixon, supra note 40, at 269.
388. See text accompanying notes 123-25 supra.
389. Mixon, supra note 40, at 269.
390. Moncur v. Jones, 72 S.D. 202, 214, 31 N.W.2d 759, 765 (1948); Federal Land Bank v.
King, 132 Tex. 481, 485, 122 S.w.2d 1061, 1063 (1939).
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gal action force individual cooperators to pay the corporate bills."'
Nevertheless, if the corporation defaults in its obligations, the coopera-
tors will effectively be forced to pay corporate creditors to prevent the
loss of their financial investment. Moreover, the corporate creditor
may hold a blanket mortgage given by the corporation on the building
and possibly even the underlying land that make up the cooperative
project. The mortgagee's right to foreclose and force a sale of the mort-
gaged property may be superior to the rights of the cooperators to live
in the cooperative project. 392 Likewise, if the corporation is forced to
declare bankruptcy, the claims of all its creditors will be paid in full
before any of the cooperator-shareholders receive a distribution.393 In
either case, the individual cooperators would be unable to stand behind
the corporate structure and refuse to answer personally to corporate
creditors. To do so would cost them their homes.
The precarious position of the cooperators in this regard raises the
issue of whether the homestead exemption should be superior or infer-
ior to the claims of corporate creditors. Two competing interests are at
stake. The first is the broad purpose of homestead statutes to protect
the home of a debtor from forced sale. The other is the right of corpo-
rate creditors to look to corporate assets as a source for repayment of
obligations incurred by the corporation. If a creditor could not seek
satisfaction from the only significant assets of a cooperative corpora-
tion--he land and buildings-because individual cooperator's apart-
ments were protected by the state's homestead laws, it is probable that
many potential creditors would refrain from advancing any credit at
all. Financial realities are thus at loggerheads with the purpose of the
homestead laws. On balance, while homestead laws should protect a
cooperator's interest from personal creditors' claims, these laws should
not shelter the cooperative property from the claims of creditors of the
corporation.394
Most homestead legislation provides for a monetary limitation on
the amount of property which can be claimed under the exemption.
The cooperator's interest must therefore be valued to determine the ex-
tent of its qualification for protection. This valuation should ignore the
corporate ownership of the real estate and consider the cooperator's
proportionate share of the project's land value at the time of homestead
391. P. KEHOE, supra note 383, at 15-16.
392. Id. at 30.
The cooperative corporation may have given a mortgage to finance its own purchase of the
building and land. This is referred to as a blanket mortgage. The installment payments are made
by allocating a portion of the project assessments paid by each cooperator to this end.
393. Id. at 30.
394. California seems to have reached this result. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1237 (West Supp. 1978)
provides that "[t]he dwelling house may be in a ... stock cooperative. . . .In such cases. . . an
underlying lease or sublease, indebtedness, security or other interest or obligation may be en-
forced in the same manner as if no homestead were declared .. "
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qualification.395 Furthermore, the cooperator's homestead exemption
cannot be limited to a proportionate share of one exemption for the
entire cooperative project. To assure cooperator's homestead protec-
tion that is coextensive with that available to owners of single-family
residences, each cooperator's apartment unit must be entitled to its own
homestead exemption.396
VII. CONCLUSION
From the inception of the use of stock-owned cooperative housing,
courts have struggled to assign a name to the cooperator's interest. The
concept of cooperative apartments developed long after the common
law characterized property interests as either personalty or realty. This
apparently simple but technical scheme of classification proves particu-
larly dysfunctional when applied to cooperatives because the coopera-
tive form does not fit comfortably within either pigeonhole.
The cooperator possesses too many rights and obligations peculiar
to fee ownership to be classified as a mere tenant with only a personalty
interest in the leasehold. The two components of the cooperator's in-
terest-stock and a long term lease--considered separately are easily
classified as personal property. When these interests are combined,
however, these components no longer resemble their parts. The pre-
ceding analysis shows that insistence upon viewing the quantum of the
cooperator's rights as a personalty interest often defeats the coopera-
tive's policy of shared ownership.
Similarly, the concept and passage of homestead exemption legis-
lation predated the widespread use of cooperative apartments as an al-
ternative to single-family home ownership. Although the legislation
typically did not define the precise property interest a claimant must
possess to take advantage of the exemptions, the states were commonly
motivated by a desire to secure to a debtor and his or her family a
"home" safe from creditor's claims. Statistics reveal that the modern
cooperative usually serves as the cooperator's primary residence. The
cooperator utilizes the vehicle of stock ownership in the cooperative
project to guarantee his or her right to possess the cooperative apart-
ment. The right to possess the cooperative apartment-home is as in
need of protection from creditors' claims as is the possession of an own-
er of a single-family residence.
The denials of homestead exemptions to cooperators in the
Wartels and Brandywine decisions demonstrate the inequity resulting
from the law's resistance to extending the boundaries of old concepts to
encompass new, but analogous, situations. The law of cooperative
ownership fails to meet the expectations of cooperators, even though no
395. Mixon, supra note 40, at 268.
396. See note 141 supra.
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good reason exists for the failure to include the interests of cooperators
within the protection of homestead exemptions. Recognition of the
real nature of the cooperator's interest in his or her apartment would
spare the courts the task of applying mechanical characterizations to
define the cooperators' interest. The expectations of the cooperator
would be fulfilled, and the policy underlying homestead legisla-
tion-protecting the debtor and his or her family in their "home"
-would be realized.
A POSTSCRIPT: THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1978
The Bankruptcy Act in effect until October 1, 1979,3 9 7 merely in-
corporates into federal bankruptcy law the various state exemption
statutes and decisions, as well as other federal statutes that grant al-
lowances and exemptions. 39' A cooperator who invokes bankruptcy
must rely on his or her state homestead exemption to protect his or her
cooperative apartment. Thus, the bankrupt cooperator can now claim
a bankruptcy exemption in a cooperative apartment only if the state in
which he or she is domiciled protects the cooperative apartment under
its homestead laws or the decisions construing them.
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 9 which will be effective
substantively on October 1, 1979, will have a profound effect on the
nature of the cooperator's interest in bankruptcy. The new Act specifi-
cally includes the debtor's interest in a cooperative among the bank-
ruptcy exemptions:
The following property may be exempted...
The debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed $7,500 in value,
in real property or personal property that the debtor or a depen-
dent of the debtor uses as a residence, in a cooperative that owns
property that the debtor or a dependent of the debtor uses as a
residence, .... 400
When the new federal bankruptcy law was considered, the dispar-
ity in the exemptions offered by the states militated in favor of uniform
bankruptcy exemptions. The states, however, preferred to retain their
397. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1103 (1976).
398. IA COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 6.13, at 867-68 (14th ed. 1978).
Currently, no uniform exemption legislation exists. In 1976, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws promulgated a Uniform Exemption Statute. None of the
states, however, have elected to adopt the uniform act. See D. EPSTEIN & J. LANDERS, DEBTORS
AND CREDITORS 131 (1978). One commentator suggests that debtor-creditor law, for nonban-
kruptcy matters as well as in the bankruptcy courts, would be much improved by the enactment of
federal preemptive exemption legislation. Shanker, The Abuse and Use of Federal Bankruptcy
Power, 26 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 3 (1975). Federal preemption, the author states, would eliminate
"tension-creating situations" such as improper motivations either in favor of or against bank-
ruptcy declaration dependent upon state exemption provisions. Id. at 10-11.
399. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (to be codified in II U.S.C. §§ 101-411).
The Bankruptcy Reform Act may also be found at 47 U.S.L.W. 1-44 (1978).
400. Bankruptcy Reform Act, supra note 399, § 522(d)(1) (emphasis added).
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chosen methods of protecting debtors.4"' The Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978 strikes a middle ground between these positions. The Act es-
tablishes a uniform federal exemption, 4°2 but it also preserves the right
of the individual states to provide for other more or less generous treat-
ment of debtors." 3 Thus, under the new Act, the debtor may claim (1)
an exemption as to any property exempted under nonbankruptcy fed-
eral law, state law, or local law, or (2) the federal bankruptcy exemp-
tion unless the state law applicable to the debtor "specifically does not
so authorize. '4 °4
The exemption provided in the Bankruptcy Reform Act will affect
homestead exemption claimants. Although homestead exemption stat-
utes are available to debtors in attachment and execution proceedings,
they are used frequently in bankruptcy proceedings. Furthermore,
once the cooperator-debtor has chosen to declare bankruptcy, he or she
is likely to choose the federal bankruptcy exemption over his or her
state homestead exemption unless (1) the homestead provisions in his
or her state are more generous than the federal exemption, or (2) his or
her state has overruled the use of the federal exemption through spe-
cific state legislation.
It is unclear at this time which states, if any, may choose to disal-
low the federal exemption with their own legislation. In addition,
because there is, of course, no case authority under the new Act, the
precise effect of current state legislation and the potential effects of fu-
ture legislative attempts to overrule the bankruptcy exemptions is un-
known. In any event, the attempt to provide some uniformity in
bankruptcy exemption law has been weakened by allowing state legis-
latures to prohibit the use of the federal minimum exemptions in a
bankruptcy case. The cooperator-bankrupt may be unable to claim the
new federal minimum exemption, which specifically protects an inter-
est in a cooperative apartment, if his or her state legislature prohibits
use of the federal minimum exemption. If the cooperator is precluded
from electing the bankruptcy exemption by state law, or if he or she
chooses state exemptions, the conflicting, confused, and often inequita-
ble state law analyzed in this article will determine whether his or her
401. IA COLLIER, supra note 398, 6.02, at 796 & n.10.
402. Bankruptcy Reform Act, supra note 399, § 522(d).
403. Id. § 522(b).
This exemption provision in the new Act actually represents a compromise between the
House and Senate versions of the bill. The House had provided for a federal minimum exemp-
tion, but gave the debtor an option to elect the state exemptions. The Senate bill, however, had
retained the prior method of incorporating the state law of exemptions into a bankruptcy case.
King, The New Bankruptcy Code.- Many Improvements Over Earlier Law, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 6, 1978
at 26, col. 4.
404. Bankruptcy Reform Act, supra note 399, § 522(b)(1).
In addition, the debtor may claim as exempt any interest in property that the debtor held as a
tenant by the entirety or joint tenant to the extent that such interest is exempt from process under
applicable nonbankruptcy law. Id. § 522(b)(2)(B).
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interest in a cooperative apartment is exempted in the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding.
